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ABSTRACT 
THE INFLUENCE OF ENERGY POLITICS ON CONFLICT 
 
Efeçınar, Eftal 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Nil Şatana 
 
December 2008 
 
 This thesis analyzes the energy sector and its effects on inter-state conflict in 
the world, to find out whether the decreasing energy resources in the world 
influences the probability of conflict. The thesis tries to explain the relation between 
producer countries and consumer countries in disputes, and to show the interaction 
between a state’s consumption and its production in order to examine the overall 
need. Starting with the literature review, the thesis focuses on the various causes of 
conflict while examining energy scarcity as a source of conflict. The theoretical 
chapter first explores why and how a state’s energy needs increase that state’s 
probability of getting involved in conflicts. Next, the theoretical framework in which 
a producer state is more likely to get into a conflict with a consumer state is 
explained. Finally, a discussion of the effect of major power presence in the dyad on 
likelihood of conflict follows. In the comparative case study chapter, the cases of the 
US-Iraq conflict of 2003, and the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008 are compared and 
analyzed within the elaborated theoretical framework.  
Keywords: energy, conflict, US-Iraq, Russia-Georgia.    
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ÖZET 
 
ENERJİ POLİTİKALARININ ÇATIŞMALAR ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ 
Efeçınar, Eftal 
Master,  Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Dr. Nil Şatana 
 
Aralık 2008 
 
Bu çalışma, enerji piyasasını, bu piyasanın dünyadaki ülkeler arası ilişkilere 
etkisini konu almaktadır ve bu tezde fosil enerji kaynaklarının azalmasının 
dünyadaki çatışmaları etkileyip etkilemediği üzerine araştırma yapılmıştır. Bu tez, 
enerji piyasasındaki üreticilerle tüketicilerin ilişkilerini, bunun uluslararası ilişkilere 
etkisini, ve bir devletin tüketiminin üretimine oranının dış politikaya yansımaları 
üzerine sonuçlara varılmak adına yazılmıştır. Bu amaçla tezde niteliksel yöntemlerin 
kullanımına öncelik verilmiştir. Çalışma, karşılaştırmalı olay analizi üzerinden 
yapılmış, bunu gerçekleştirmek için ABD-Irak, Rusya-Gürcistan çatışmaları bir 
araştırma metodu olan karşılaştırmalı durum çalışmaları kullanılarak seçilmiş ve 
öngörülen teoriyi araştırmak için kullanılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: enerji, çatışma, uluslararası savaş, ABD, Irak, Rusya, 
Gürcistan.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  
 
“Conflict over valuable resources- and the power and wealth 
they confer- has become an increasingly prominent feature on the 
global landscape. Often intermixed with ethnic, religious, and tribal 
antagonisms, such conflict has posed a significant and growing 
threat to peace and stability in many areas of the world (Klare 2001, 
ix).  
 
Resource wars will become in the years ahead, the most 
distinctive feature of the global security environment... The priority 
accorded to economic considerations by national leaders, the ever-
growing demand for a wide range of basic commodities, looming 
shortages of certain key materials, social and political instability in 
areas harboring major reserves of vital commodities, and the 
proliferation of disputes over the ownership of important sources of 
supply... Some of these problems will be mitigated by market forces 
and the onward progress of technology: others, however, will be 
exarbated by the corrosive side effects of globalization (Klare 2001, 
214) .” 
 
Conflict has played a crucial role in international politics throughout the 
history not just because it has resulted in serious injuries in human life, nation states 
and international relations, but also because it has lead to constant changes in the 
stability of world system. Wilkenfeld and Brecher (2000) defines conflict as “the 
overt, coercive interactions of contending collectivities, involving two or more 
parties using coercion to injure or control their opponents.” Various issues related to 
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conflict, such as causes and consequences of it, have been researched by numerous 
scholars of international relations. 
 
Besides, after the end of the Cold War, some scholars tried to explain the 
relationship between energy resources and conflict. Energy resources are vital for 
human life in an industrialized country because of its widespread use. Energy is 
significant not only for its use in the manufacturing sector, transportation and trade; 
but also and especially for its use in national defense. Currently, the fossil energy 
resources –oil, gas and coal- comprise nearly 80% of the energy market, compared to  
alternative energy resources. As the population of a state increases and technological 
developments spread, the need of indispensable fossil energy resources also increases 
(Choucri and North 1972, 86). Fossil energy resources are distributed unequally in 
the world and their asymmetric distribution produces competition over them. 
Although coal as a fossil energy source is distributed nearly equally all around the 
world, others such as oil and natural gas resources have been concentrated in certain 
parts of the world. For example, two thirds of proven oil reserves are located in Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This unequal 
distribution of oil and natural gas resources in the world ignited concerns of states 
about security of energy supply.  
 
This thesis focuses on the topic of energy and conflict because of the 
prominence of the need of energy by all states and the above-mentioned unevenness 
of resources. Not a day goes by without international news on energy politics. The 
conflict that inspired this thesis and its focus on energy politics was the first war I 
have actually witnessed, Iraq-Kuwait war, which took place in 1991.  In the news the 
aim of this war was explained as Iraq’s territorial demands from Kuwait, and the 
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reason for Iraq to ask for Kuwaiti territory was the huge amount of oil in its borders. 
Besides, Kuwait was key to Iraq’s aspirations as a regional power and its dominance 
over the Arab society. However, the United States did not let Iraq achieve its aims 
and helped Kuwait. After some research on this conflict, I started thinking that the 
energy politics in the region was the main cause of the conflict and the U.S. 
intervention, and for the next decades, I have always paid more attention to the news 
on energy and conflict. 
 
This interest in fossil energy resources led me to the research question of this 
thesis: how does the decrease in energy resources influence conflicts in the world? In 
other words, are two countries more likely to fight one another if one is in desperate 
need of energy that the other has. The realist theory argues that survival is significant 
for all states and the need of survival is crucial to conducting relations with other 
states. When states cannot extract resources that they need from their own territory, 
they search for other means to provide them, and in case they are faced with 
difficulties, they tend to use all capabilities to obtain their needs. The energy market 
is significant from this point of view, since the energy resources are the core 
necessity of states’ industries and economies, the competition over energy and its 
implications over survival are substantial. In line with the realist theory, I posit that a 
fossil energy consumer country focuses on minimizing its use of the fossil energy 
resources, and tries to create crucial technologies to use alternative resources. 
However, some consumers, which are often powerful states, may choose direct 
intervention to energy-rich countries both economically via multinational 
corporations and militarily, by using force. Fossil energy producers, on the other 
hand, are interested in guaranteeing the demand while they also pay attention to 
monopolizing their energy market and protecting territories that have huge reserves. 
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In addition, the transit countries, which transit fossil energy resources from producer 
to consumer states, try to protect their primacy in the trade ways to gain more and to 
develop their economies, and they prevent others to change the existing routes of 
trade.  
 
Since different kinds of states have different motives in energy politics, 
sometimes their interests clash and they take different measures to accomplish their 
goals in the energy market. In addition, the difference between the theory of this 
thesis and the literature is that this theory takes the energy resources’s scarcity 
concept in a macro level and focuses on scarcity in the world. This logic leads to the 
four hypotheses that are explored in this thesis. First hypothesis is that a state’s 
increasing need of fossil energy resources, which can be calculated by the proportion 
of production of that state with consumption of these resources in the same state, 
increases the likelihood of conflict. In addition, the second hypothesis is that a fossil 
energy consumer state is more likely to be in conflict with a producer state. The third 
hypothesis involves the effect of major power presence from the realist literature and 
argues that major power presence in a crisis increases the likelihood of conflict. 
Lastly, the fourth hypothesis focuses on the initiators of war; although consumer 
states tend to initiate war in cases where their energy supply is cut off and alternate is 
required. They are not the only initiators of such aggression. Producing states may 
also become initiators of war due to concerns of the market and market supremacy.  
 
Chapter II includes the literature review for both the inter-state conflict 
literature and the  literature on energy politics. The literature on international conflict 
and its causes is a complex one, from which I will use two levels of analysis: system, 
and state level. Under system level, power, polarity and alliance ties as causes of 
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conflict will be explained under the realist/neorealist theory besides the power 
transition, power cycle and hegemonic stability theories. On the other hand, territory, 
contiguity, regime type, public opinion and complex interdependence as causes of 
conflict will generate the “state level” analysis of the literature review. Besides all 
these issues that lead to conflict, some scholars have emphasized the importance of 
religion and ethnicity, which will also be explained in this chapter. 
  
The energy literature will be the focus of the second part of Chapter II. This 
part examines why fossil energy resources have a huge capacity to shape world 
policies, and foreign policies of states. Energy market and its effects on international 
security, especially on international conflict is analyzed. To begin with, the 
importance of energy resources will be explained in system and state levels. The 
reasons for past and possible future conflicts which have been identified in literature 
are examined. The chapter ends with crucial examples of energy politics to make 
theoretical explanation more practical. 
 
In Chapter III, which reveals the theoretical framework and the 
methodological approach of the thesis, the focus is on the causal relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variable, and the method that is chosen 
to study the relationship. After explaining the briefly above-mentioned theory in 
more detail, the chapter explains all variables one by one, and clarifies the research 
design.  
 
Chapter IV uses the comparative case study method with the help of the most 
different systems design as it is explained in Chapter III. Starting with the control 
variables; regime type, territory, polity missions, ethnicity, major power status, 
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alliances, capability and trade will be used as control variables, since these are the 
core causes of conflicts according to the literature. All of these variables and their 
importance for the cases will be explained one by one, while examining the cases. 
Both the Iraq-US dyad and the Russia- Georgia dyad are Producer-Consumer dyads 
and, since one of the hypotheses states that a producer-consumer dyad is more likely 
to go to war than either a producer-producer dyad or consumer-consumer dyad, this 
is a beneficial starting point. In addition, both cases have a major power presence in 
the dyad, one of the independent variables. For the dependent variable, it is obvious 
that both of the conflicts have turned into a war. Both cases are explained in terms of 
their historical developments, causes, and most importantly in the context of energy 
politics. The cases show that energy politics is influential in a conflict especially 
when one of the sides is a major power that is a consumer country in need of energy 
resources.  
 
This thesis contributes to the international relations literature since energy 
and its effect on conflict has increasingly become relevant to world politics. After the 
end of the Cold War, states have often come to the brink of conflict because of 
energy resource scarcity, changes in transportation routes, usage of wells in the 
borders or usage of energy in the open seas. The need of survival makes the states 
more prone to conflicts for energy since energy is necessary in every economic 
activity of a state but for developing states only energy need is not enough to initiate 
a conflict, because presence of energy resources does not cover the costs of a conflict 
in these developing states. This thesis shows that major powers such as the U.S. and 
Russia are more likely to engage in energy related disputes while developing states 
still fight over traditional conflict causes such as territory and ethnonationalism 
instead of risking their security with energy related issues.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Causes of Inter-State Conflict 
 
The literature on international conflicts and their causes have been a complex 
one, and starting off I decided to follow the general trend in the literature and 
organize examining the variables using different levels of analysis. In this chapter of 
the thesis, three levels of analysis will be used: System level, state level and 
individual level. Under system level, concepts such as power, polarity and alliance 
ties and their effects on likelihood of conflict will be explained using the (neo)realist 
theory as well as power transition, power cycle and hegemonic stability theories. On 
the other hand variables and concepts such as territory, contiguity, regime type, 
public opinion and complex interdependence will generate the “state level” analysis 
of the literature review. 
 
 System level of analysis in international relations is used mostly by realists 
and neo-realists to examine not only the changes in the number of conflicts, but also 
the changes in the characteristics of conflict. Polarity, which can be defined as 
resource and power distribution and number of autonomous powers in the 
international system (Bueno de Mesquita 1975), is the first factor that explains 
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conflict in the systemic level (Kaplan 1957; Mearsheimer 1990; Midlarsky 1988; 
Morgenthau 1967; Rosecrence 1966). In bipolarity, the concentration of power is 
under the control of two superpowers whereas in multipolarity a group of relatively 
equal power controls the global system both militarily and politically (Waltz 1964). 
Bipolarity was exercised in the first part of the Cold War by the United States and 
the Soviet Union, while multipolarity was exercised between the two world wars 
(1918-1939). In addition to these, Wilkenfeld and Brecher (2000, 283) defines 
polycentrism, which has been exercised by the world in the second part of the Cold 
War, as military power in the hand of two superpowers and political power with 
multiple centers. Unequal power structures create a less stable world where crises 
turn into conflicts. On the other hand, a unipolar world, which consists of one global 
power, has been accepted as the most stable and the least war-prone world system of 
all, although it is quite rare (Gilpin 1981; Organski 1958). Due to the capability 
advantage in a hegemonic state within unipolar systems, the possibility of war 
between small or middle powers decreases.  Although most scholars agree on the 
stability of a unipolar world, they do not agree on the stability of other systems 
(multipolar, bipolar and polycentric systems). While Waltz (1979) believes that a 
bipolar world creates a more balanced world, and is not prone to wars, Morgenthau 
(1967) finds multipolarity as the most stable system because of the flexibility of 
alliance formation. Consequently, polarized international systems are more stable 
than power shifts in the systemic level. Any shifts from unipolarity to bipolarity, or 
bipolarity to multipolarity make the world system more prone to conflict (Gilpin 
1981; Organski 1958). 
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The distribution of power between states also influences the likelihood of war 
occurrence. The concept of “capability balance” has been explained differently using 
the realist balance of power theory, power transition, hegemonic decline, and long 
cycle theories. These different theories agree that differences in the power 
capabilities of states affect the likelihood and frequency of war (Gilpin 1981; 
Organski 1958; Waltz 1979; Wright 1964). In the balance of power theory, nearly 
equal distribution of military, economic, social and political power makes two states 
more peaceful, because in an unequal distribution of power, the stronger state would 
be more aggressive against the weaker state because the former is not deterred by the 
power of the latter. Threat perception leads states to a balance of power situation; 
when a state increases its power and becomes too powerful in comparison to others, 
the other states feel the threat and start to rise their own power to balance against it.    
 
In the long cycle and power transition theories, the prediction is that equal 
distribution of power among a challenger and a dominant status quo state leads to 
conflict if the challenger is dissatisfied with the status quo. Power transition theory 
basically rejects the three common assumptions of realism. This theory argues that 
the international system is not structured in an anarchy as realists believe; it is 
hierarchical. The domestic and international rules that are governing the states in the 
system are essentially similar, and cooperation does not occur to take full advantage 
of the powers of states but to maximize the net gains (Kugler and Organski 1989). 
Because the most powerful countries stabilize the world system, the only way for 
conflict to happen is the possibility of a challenger that is not satisfied with the 
system. “Degrees of satisfaction as well as power are critical determinants of peace 
and conflict. Great nations that support the international order are allies of dominant 
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nation and help determine how smoothly the system runs” (Kugler and Organski 
1989). With these movements, the great nations and the dominant nation are able to 
protect the status quo but peace can be threatened by a nation which is not satisfied 
with the status quo and thus searches for a new international order with its increasing 
power. In essence, power transition theory argues that satisfaction of the big powers 
with the status quo stabilizes the system, but any dissatisfaction can create an attempt 
for a leadership war (Hebron, James and Rudy 2007: Levy 1985).  
 
Power cycle theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of time for 
the system and the states to explain conflict occurrence. It mentions that any change 
in relative capabilities of the states and any critical point in the history of the states 
and the world might lead to war.  
 
Most of the leading states in the system have followed a path of 
systemic power and role as indexed by their capability relative to that 
of others in the central system – that is marked by ascendancy, 
maturation and decline. For most states, absolute levels of capability 
increase by some upward –bending function over long time periods. 
But, relative to the indicators, if traced over long enough intervals, tend 
to follow the pattern of rise and decline of the power cycle (Doran 
1989, 85). 
 
With this explanation, it can be said that a state is more likely to engage in a 
war when it is at a critical point of that nation’s relative power cycle, which changes 
the status quo in the system. The concept of relative capability is particularly 
important for the power cycle theory, because it explains that when states have 
relative capabilities, the system can continue its balance and harmonic relations 
(Levy 1985; Modelski, and Thompson 1989). However, when a state gains relatively 
more power than the others, its ability to influence international political issues 
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increases, the leadership of that state expands, which consequently may lead to a 
conflict. 
 
Similarly, hegemonic stability theory accepts that the international system is 
governed by a dominant power which is prevailing in terms of military and economic 
concerns (Gilpin 1988; Levy 1985). The world will serve the interests of the 
dominant power and the other states “will seek to change the international system 
through territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal costs of 
further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits” (Modelski and 
Thompson 1989, 30). Power hierarchy creates competition in the global order and for 
a state to create or to maintain a regime, the support of the dominant power is crucial.  
 
After elaborating polarity as the first systemic factor that affects conflict, 
alliances are the next important cause of inter-state conflict. The effect of alliances 
on conflict is plagued by mixed evidence. Two strands of research focus on two 
causal links: the effect of alliances on number of conflicts, and the effect of alliances 
on the characteristics of conflicts. In the first strand of the alliances literature, the 
notion that “alliances deter war by maintaining military equilibrium” has been 
accepted by some theorists (Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan 1973), while other 
scholars (Jervis 1976; Midlarsky 1988; Vasquez 1993) agree that alliances are more 
likely to be balanced by counter-alliances, which would bring violence to the system 
(Jervis 1976). Also, “the greater the number of alliance commitments in the system, 
the more war the system will experience” (Singer and Small 1968, 251). Moreover, 
some theorists agree that alliances also affect the characteristics of conflict such as its 
duration, hostility, and magnitude. Alliances increase the probability of severity of 
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conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita 1978; Midlarsky 1986; Wallace 1973). In addition to 
these general ideas on alliances, Vasquez believes that types of alliances are also 
influential on conflicts (Vasquez 1993, 312). He argues that some global institutional 
alliances, which limit the movement of members in the usage of power, decrease the 
possibility of war, while alliances that include a major state involvement are more 
prone to conflict. Furthermore, new alliances are more problematic than the alliances 
that have been established for more than 50 years. Also, alliances established at a 
time of war are more prone to conflicts (Vasquez 1993, 313).  
 
In sum, the literature of realist school shows that alliances are more prone to 
wars when they are encouraging counter-alliances.  Neorealism, on the other hand, 
supports a counter-argument on alliances, as it believes that since the international 
system is anarchical, distribution of power is the central focus of this system and 
alliance establishment provides balance of power and decreases the likelihood of 
conflict in the system. Waltz (1964) explains that achieving the balance of power 
between the states can reduce the number of conflicts, but anarchical systems are 
always prone to conflict.  He also believes that a bipolar system is less prone to 
conflict as in the Cold War era (Waltz 1979, 209).  
 
The frequency of wars in the system appears in the literature as the third 
systemic factor as a cause of inter-state conflict. Ongoing wars are strictly related to 
the new wars that arise in the international arena. The high frequency of wars in any 
region increases the likelihood or the number of wars in the same region (Geller 
2000; Goertz and Diehl 1993; Maoz 1989).  Maoz’s research (1995) under the 
Correlates of War project shows that in a regional environment with high frequency 
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of revolutionary regime changes, the possibility of inter-state conflict increases.  This 
argument has been empirically supported by the Correlates of War data (Sarkees 
2000). Another point on this issue is the presence of war in a region directly 
influencing the characteristics of the crisis. Because conflict in the system 
encourages other states to increase their capabilities to protect themselves, an 
increase in these military capabilities can trigger any crisis to turn into a conflict. In 
addition, this creates a security dilemma which ends up in an arms race and 
instability of power which might also lead to conflict. 
 
The second level of analysis to focus is the state (dyadic) level. At the dyadic 
level of analysis, contiguity, and territorial proximity are the most commonly studied 
factors in the literature.  Theory on territorial proximity posits that neighboring states 
are more likely to fight with each other because proximity decreases the cost of wars, 
and rather than reaching peaceful settlement, states choose to engage in war, as long 
as absolute gains are possible (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1991; Midlarsky 1975; Vasquez 
1993; Wallensteen 1981). Wilkenfeld and Brecher (2000, 287) argues that contiguity 
allows adversaries to undertake military action by moving troops and equipment to a 
common border, making the resort to violence easier. “Distant adversaries can be 
expected to exhibit a wider range of crisis behavior, since launching military action 
under such circumstances is a considerably more serious and costly undertaking” 
(Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2000, 287). 
 
Territorial proximity allows a state to increase its interests in the region, and 
rather than finding peaceful solutions to a crisis and making relative gains possible, 
neighboring countries prefer absolute gains by converting crisis into conflicts. 
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Talking about relative and absolute gains carries neorealist and neoliberal theories 
once again into the scene. Neo-realists focus on relative gains, saying that because 
the states are focusing on the relative gains, cooperation is just an exception in 
international relations, while neo-liberalists believe that absolute gains are inspiring 
for states (Keohane 1986; Rousseau 1999). Singer and Small (1968) have tried to 
explain this pattern through empirical research, by taking the Correlates of War 
project as a starting point. The results show that “the average distance between 
capitals of warring states was significantly less than the average intercapital distance 
of all-state dyads for the period under analysis (1816-1965)” (Singer and Small 
1968). Apparently, crises are more likely to turn into conflicts if the land and sea 
borders of the dyads are close to each other because proximity decreases the cost of 
wars. As a result, contagious land or sea between two states increases the frequency 
of wars within a dyad. 
 
Borders, which exemplify territorial proximity, are another factor in the state 
level of analysis. Geography is very significant for a state to construct its foreign 
policy. For example, states which are separated from others by sea or ocean can 
isolate themselves from world politics or they can engage in wars overseas with less 
concern at home. However, continental states sharing borders with others and 
especially to instable regions need to engage in world politics, establish alliances to 
protect themselves and increase their capabilities to defend themselves (Diehl 1991). 
Contiguity creates security problems within bordering states, and it creates new 
threat perceptions, which can lead to conflict (Diehl 1991; Midlarsky 1975; Starr 
1991; Wright 1964). “Crises between contiguous or near-neighbor adversaries were 
more likely to be triggered by violence than were crises between more distant 
14 
adversaries” (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2000). In addition, borders increase the war 
proneness of these states in case there are disputes about these borders.  
 
 The third dyadic level variable is the political system of the states within a 
dyad. The most significant proposition that explains the effect of regime type on the 
conflict decision is the “democratic peace” proposition. Democratic peace 
proposition posits that “democracies very rarely –if at all- make war on each other.” 
(Russett 1983) In democratic states, because decisions are made by a mass 
population, the general public would most likely directly oppose war because of its 
costs (Bremer 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Gleditsch 1995). Three 
common theories explain the democratic peace proposition more clearly. Institutional 
approach examines the effect of institutional framework on conflict and the main 
point is that complexity in political mobilization explains why democracies do not go 
to war with each other, because these institutions are imposing some constraints on 
governors (Bueno de Mesquita et all. 1999). While the institutional approach is 
focusing on legal and constitutional constraints, the normative approach focuses on 
the effects of norms: “…norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their 
conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes” (Maoz and Russett 1993). In 
addition to the institutional and normative approaches, Kantian perpetual peace 
proposition asserts the idea of consent. He argues that since a democratic country 
needs to search for the consent of its citizens, the possibility of war would decrease.  
 
…if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war 
should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), 
nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in 
commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the 
calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having 
to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to 
15 
repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of 
evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter 
peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant 
wars in the future (Kant 1939). 
 
Decisions are more likely to be in favor of peaceful solution to disputes 
because wars cost so much to democratic countries. “Although democracies are no 
less prone than non democracies to engage in violence in pursuit of their interest, 
democracies rarely employ war as a means for resolving conflicts with other 
democracies” (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2000, 290). In contrast, these theorists 
support the notion that in authoritarian states, the decision making process is neither 
limited by the constitution, nor by public opinion. Thus, authoritarian leaders are 
more likely to go to war. So, Kant would argue that the more democracy spreads 
throughout the world, the less conflict will remain in the system; thus, perpetual 
peace will be possible.  
 
The level of economic development within a dyad has also been a popular 
explanation of causes of inter-state conflict. Liberal economic thought is based on 
free trade, market economy and international peace. Free trade creates 
interdependence between states, and as long as states are interdependent on each 
other’s markets to continue their economic vis-à-vis political stability, conflict 
between trading states is too costly. Therefore, capitalist states are not likely to 
engage in a conflict as long as they have established liberal economic systems. 
Instead, they prefer to find solutions to problems by peaceful settlements (Bremer 
1992; Buzan 1984; Geller 2000; Wright 1964). In addition to trade, economic 
production is also significant for dyads. “States with economic system based on 
commerce and industry have been less war prone than those with economies based 
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on agriculture or animal pasturage, and he goes on to suggest that the interactions of 
states at advanced levels of economic development are characterized by lower 
probabilities of conflict” (Geller 2000, 421). Because of agriculture, land is crucial. 
Protecting their own land or obtaining more land are important to the national 
interests of agricultural states. However, for industrial states, trade and good relations 
with neighbors to guarantee imports and exports are more significant than the 
absolute gains of the conflicts. Thus, agricultural states are more likely to engage in 
conflict when a crisis arises due to expectation of absolute gains. On the other hand, 
industrial states prefer relative gains and do not engage in conflict. Consequently, 
trade is the common factor that influences the decisions of governments, and it is a 
significant factor that leads to peaceful settlements (Geller 2000, 421).  
 
Public opinion and its effects on foreign policy and on the decision to go to 
war are relatively new issues in the International Relations literature, which tries to 
move beyond the realist argument that the state is the only “unitary” actor in world 
politics. Two basic standpoints which are, “leaders follows the masses” (Neack 
2003) and “elite affects the public opinion to be shaped,” are in the agenda about the 
public opinion and foreign policy decisions.  
 
Scholars like Neack (2003), Nincic, and Russett (1979) agree that public 
opinion affects politics in both democratic and non-democratic countries. In 
democratic states, because of the constraints of democracy, public opinion affects the 
leaders and foreign policy making period positively. “Democratic systems by their 
nature allow for more public involvement in the policy making process. But, scholars 
have wondered about the processes by which public opinion gets translated into 
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influence on the foreign policy-making process in democracies” (Neack 2003). 
Although this is an indirect effect, the democratic governments are influenced by the 
public opinion more than public opinion is affected from the governance (Neack 
2003; Nincic 1992; Russett and Graham 1989). On the other hand, from the 
perspective of non-democratic countries, the situation is more complex. In non-
democratic countries, the legitimacy and the constraints of states do not involve the 
public opinion in the policy making process. “Government legitimacy derives not 
from elections but from the mass public’s perception of given regime’s adherence 
and faithfulness to powerful transnational symbols” (Neack 2003) like ideologies, 
religion etc. In addition, in these states, public opinion is used to influence the other 
state’s governors by manipulating the public opinion and the media. These ideas can 
be summed up by saying that the initiation of war is not directly affected by public 
opinion regardless of the regime of the country (democratic or non-democratic). 
Moreover, public opinion has manipulative power over the state’s rulers. In 
democratic states, it is possible for public opinion to accept the costs of war, while it 
is also possible to reject the war directly. In addition, in the non-democratic states, it 
is easy to create masses with public opinion to go to a war.  
 
In state level, the complex interdependence theory proposes another 
explanation for conflict initiation. Liberal complex interdependence theory explains 
that trade increases bilateral communication, and because of the dependency that 
trade creates, good relations develop between two states . Thus, the possibility of war 
decreases (Keohane and Nye 1977). On the other hand, realists support that more 
trade dependence leads to conflict rather than cooperation (Pevehouse 2004). 
According to realists, the interdependence creates inequality and source of insecurity, 
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“interdependence breeds no accommodation and harmony but suspicion and 
incompatibility” (Mc Millan 1997, 40). “Interdependence is not a matter of mutual 
and symmetrical interactions as liberalism assumes, and the power inherent in 
asymmetric economic relationships does matter for international politics particularly 
the onset of war” (Mc Millan 1997, 41). So, it can be said that a general concern that 
realists share lies here: complex interdependence between states not only influences 
states economically, but also increases the concern over war vis-à-vis insecurity. 
Because they believe that inequality in supply and demand of any commodity used 
by the states increases the problems in the market share, they believe that trade does 
not make the relations between states stronger, but leads to the very opposite, greater 
uncertainty that increases the possibility of military conflict (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 
and Nye 1977).     
 
Besides state and system levels to examine the causes of conflicts, there is 
one other cause, identity, which is accepted as the major cause of civil conflict, but 
also is quite significant in the explanation of interstate conflict, too. Creation of an 
identity in a state is a gradual process (Saideman 2001). Genetic heritage, language 
and common history are crucial for a group of people to share the same identity. In 
addition, ethnic and religious awareness forms identity. With the presence of all or 
some of these common features, a group can create their own identity. Conflicts over 
identity become more possible in case members of these different identity groups 
feel threatened by any other group. Mostly, groups give strong responses to other 
groups and this leads to conflict. Nationality, religion, race and ethnicity help people 
get organized (Riggs 2007). Especially religion is a strong variable because it creates 
the possibility of separatism. In addition, any action which leads to religious 
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divisions produces strong responses (Fox 2004b). Besides, Fox’s research (2004a) 
shows that some religions are more conflict-prone than others. While Buddhism is a 
pacifist religion which is less likely to engage in conflicts, naturally Islam is more 
defensive and more prone to conflict. In the end of the cold war, rising nationalism 
led to conflict between ethnonational communities and these groups started to look 
for autonomy (Riggs 2007).  In addition, the idea of diaspora also became a 
significant cause of conflict. These crises related to the identity of groups increases 
mutual distrust and thus also the possibility for violence (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 
2000, 289). Birnir and Satana (2008), on the other hand, oppose Fox’s treatment of 
religion as a usual suspect and they find no statistical significance in the relationship 
between type of religion and conflict. Moreover, the presence of global liberal 
institutions like EU, and their guarantees for minority rights decrease the likelihood 
of violence between ethnic and religious groups.  
 
 
 
2.2 Literature on Energy Resources and Their Effect on Inter-State 
Conflict 
 
Widespread use of fossil energy resources makes them indispensable for 
human life.  These resources are vital for their usage in manufacturing sector, 
transportation and different industries, especially the defense sector. Klare (2004) 
emphasizes that fossil energy resources provide energy to tanks, ships, missiles and 
other instruments of war. Likewise, Choucri and North mentions that “A 
combination of growing population and developing technology places rapidly 
increasing demands upon resources, often resulting in internally generated pressures. 
The greater this pressure, the higher will be the likelihood of extending national 
activities outside territorial boundaries” (1972, 86). Population increase and 
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technological developments create an amplifying effect on states’ demands of fossil 
energy resources. Thus, these fossil energy resources have a capacity to shape world 
politics and the foreign policies of states. In this part of the literature review, the 
energy market and its effects on international security, especially on conflict, will be 
evaluated. To begin with, the importance of energy resources will be briefly 
explained from the system- and state-level perspectives. Then, the reasons for past 
and possible future conflicts which have been identified in the literature will be 
examined through various examples.  
 
Fossil energy resources, which have been influencing the policies of the states 
for ages, are important commodities. In the literature, fossil energy resources are 
accepted as oil, natural gas and coal. The distribution of coal is more equal 
throughout the world. The recent computations derived from BP data show that the 
top three coal reserve countries possess 61% of the world’s total reserves, more thatn 
top three oil (42%) and in gas (55%). But the idea lies behind the statement- the 
distribution of coal is more equal- is not that numbers, it is about the reserves in 
proportion to their usage and need. For example, biggest shares of coal industry is 
owned by US, Russia, China and India, and these states are the ones who need this 
resources most because of their developed or developing huge industries. However, 
oil and natural gas resources have been distributed asymmetrically and are especially 
located in the Middle East and Central Asia in which the degree of states’ 
industrialization is limited, and necessity of resources are less. On the other hand, the 
fossil energy resources can be considered in two types with respect to their 
estimation: proven and potential resources. The term, proven fossil energy resources, 
“are estimated quantities that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates 
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with reasonable certainity are recoverable under existing economic and operating 
conditions.” (EIA 2007). The new extraction technologies and research increased the 
possibility of the discovery of new energy resources. However, due to hardness of 
producing and using these new resources in which states’ need new investments on 
research and development, and because the potential reserves can only be estimated 
without any use of approximation methods and thus with no certainty,, the scholars 
choose to focus on the proven reserves rather than potential ones in their research. 
Oil and gas, more than any other unique commodities, influenced the world politics, 
and foreign decision making various times in the past. There are examples showing 
that these fossil energy resources have turned a crisis into a conflict because the need 
for energy supply has been growing day by day. The costs of conflict  are replaceable 
since the need of energy is acute. Common reasons of resource wars can be summed 
up in the words of Michael Klare (2001, 15): “… the escalating worldwide demand 
for commodities of all types, the likely emergence of resource scarcities, and 
disputes over the ownership of valuable sources of critical materials.”  Fossil energy 
resources have been the most critical ones between the natural resources throughout 
the industrial history, but some international relations scholars (Klare 2004; Yergin 
1992) discuss the causes of the increase in the number of disputes over these 
resources in the last decades. Klare (2004) and Yergin (1992) believe that the main 
cause is capitalism and the related economic security policies of industrialized states. 
In a capitalist world, industrial states are dependent on raw materials and as soon as 
the intensity of ideological conflicts abated and nearly disappeared by the end of the 
Cold War, resources rose to the top of the agenda. Klare (2001, 27) emphasizes that 
“no highly industrialized society can survive at present without substantial supplies 
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of oil, and so any significant threat to the continued availability of this resource will 
prove a cause of crisis and, in extreme cases, provoke the use of military force”.   
 
Based on this literature, first, the rising demand for energy resources and for 
all types of commodities is the reason that can turn crises into conflicts in the new 
international security agenda (Cordesman 1999; Cowhey 1985; Krapels 1993; Odell 
1979). Since the world population has been rising continuously, the need for various 
commodities is also increasing. Especially after industrialization, people’s need for 
energy resources started increasing like any other commodity that is needed for 
human survival. In this respect, every state’s need for energy increased but some 
states’ requirements were considerably larger than others with respect to their 
position in international politics and due to their economic structures. For example, 
the US alone consumes almost 30% of the energy market, which obviously increases 
the United States’s impact on world energy markets (BP 2008, 11).  
 
Newly industrialized states are also significant in the increasing demand for 
energy resources, while older industrialized states try to decrease their demand-- 
because they do not want to be dependent any more, and of course because fossil 
energy resources worsen the environment-by using energy more efficiently and by 
inclining towards renewable energy resources (Jaffe and Medlock 2005). For 
example, the US attempts to decrease its demand, and to diversify its suppliers, 
because it does not want to be so dependent on the energy-rich Middle Eastern 
countries (The Department of Energy Organization 1998), while the European Union 
attempts to decrease its demands, and move towards renewable resources in order to 
protect the environment (Commission of European Communities 2006). On the other 
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hand, especially the Asian states and Southern Asian Islands increase their demands 
with their industrialization gradually, because they are in the industrialization process 
that the West has experienced long ago (Jaffe and Medlock 2005; Kalicki and 
Goldwyn 2005; Sinton et all. 2005; Xuetang 2006).  In addition, China and India face 
a more rapid development and expansion in their industries, and their need for 
energy in the future will be more than the U.S. need at the present (Jaffe and 
Medlock 2005). So, the world demand does not decrease in the way western powers 
desire, but it increases because the need for it in the world is still substantial. Thus, 
the demand for these resources can lead to conflict if supply would not satisfy 
world’s demand. 
 
Considering the increasing demand, a shortage in fossil energy resources of 
the world is highly possible, and because these resources are limited, states can race 
for their share of the limited fossil energy resources, which can lead and has led to 
conflict (Arbatov 1986). Although development of new technologies in energy 
research has increased the amount of proven fossil energy resources, it is still not 
enough to satisfy the world consumption (Nie 2003). To put it differently, new 
extraction technologies increase the fossil resource capacity. These new technologies 
can be used to find new wells, and  they can make the companies use the current 
wells efficiently, but since world consumption on non-renewable resources is 
increasing at a faster rate, shortage seems inevitable. Thus, if states cannot resolve 
the resource shortage problem of the world, conflicts over energy will be inevitable.  
 
Lastly, competition over the proven energy resources and their geographic 
boundaries have been and will be the most likely reason for resource conflicts 
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considering the fact that“…many key sources or deposits of these materials are 
shared by two or more nations, or lie in contested border areas or offshore economic 
zones” (Klare 2001, 21). This suggests three reasons for conflict: contested sources 
of supply: borders, offshore resources, and transportation. First, in some places these 
crucial energy resources are located, situated or deposited in the middle of borders of 
two states and this may lead these two states into rivalry over these resources. The 
shared proportion of oil revenues and ownership of these wells can create a crisis 
situation between two countries, and this situation mostly turns into a conflict 
because the benefits exceed the costs of the conflict. There are three significant 
examples of this kind of conflict throughout the history: Iraq-Kuwait war, Iran-Iraq 
war, and Saudi Arabia-Yemen War (Heinberg 2003; Klare 2001, 54). Secondly, there 
is a rivalry over offshore areas depending on the definitions of these areas, which are 
still controversial for the international community. Especially, most of the crises 
arise from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
According to this convention, states have a right to explore and manage the resources 
in their exclusive economic zones, which are defined as: “The exclusive economic 
zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured” in the 57th article of UNCLOS (United 
Nations 1982, 44). Economic zone system works successfully for the states that 
border open seas and oceans; but in cases where states have borders on inland seas 
like the Caspian Sea or the sea between the Southern Asian Islands Spratleys, South 
China Sea, etc., exclusive economic zones become strictly problematic. In these 
inland seas, it becomes impossible to define borders of the exclusive economic 
zones, and the riparian or littoral states have problems in sharing the offshore 
resources. Finally, the transportation of these crucial materials creates problems in 
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straits and landlocked states as with most of the Central Asian states, because both 
the producers and consumers need to transport these commodities, but producers 
reject sharing their profits with transit countries. and this leads to conflict (Bahgat 
2006; Klare 2001; Xuetang 2006; Yergin 1992). 
 
A historical outlook is critical in this part of the literature review which would 
give a chance to look at the topic with practical information. According to most 
theorists that work on energy resources, both world wars and some other conflicts 
have taken place in order to gain the share of energy market and security of the oil 
supply (Fursenko 1990; Yergin 1992). Before WWI, oil was important for the states, 
but during the war, the significance of this resource gained more importance, because 
states started to use vehicles and logistics that use oil (Johnson 1991). Foreign 
policies began to be amended with respect of energy security threats between the two 
world wars. This period made European states engage in oil politics and World War 
II made all the world work on it. After the two world wars, the emphasis on oil 
decreased slightly because of nuclear energy; states focused on the threat of the Cold 
War and nuclear power, rather than focusing on energy needs and the security of 
demand (Kissinger 1994). When an oil embargo was imposed by the Arab states in 
the Middle East in 1973-1974, this embargo put most Western economies in 
depression. From that time on, states increasingly emphasized the security of energy 
supplies (Kissinger 1994). “Import dependent states have been concerned with 
maintaining sustainable, secure access to oil at low prices, whereas oil exporting 
states, mainly in the developing world, have been concerned with balancing the 
desire to uphold prices and revenues while maintaining market share” (Bromley et 
all. 2006, 4). Due to these reasons the Western Bloc developed new strategies for 10-
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year periods to secure their needs. For example, The Department of Energy 
Organization (1998) in US created a strategy paper called “Comprehensive National 
Energy Strategy”, which is focusing on the energy security concerns of US. This 
attempt continued by European GreenPaper called “Green Paper: A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” by Commission of 
European Communities (2006).  However, states saw that solutions to crises became 
difficult through peaceful means, and the threat of resource wars once again moved 
to the international agenda at the end of the Cold War.  
 
After the explanation of the historical constraints, I will discuss a few 
examples from the literature examined in terms of their geographic location. To start 
with, the Persian Gulf is an important region for the world oil market because this 
region has two-thirds of the market share in proven reserves. The instability in the 
region, which was created by multiple great and middle power rivalries, religious and 
ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and territorial disputes, makes it both more significant and 
vulnerable than others. In this region, “the presence of vast supplies of energy” 
increase the likelihood of warfare (Klare 2001, 80).  
 
The second region that needs to be focused on is the Caspian Sea region in 
which crises over offshore resources have occasionally broke out. In addition to that, 
this region also experienced territorial disputes over oil and gas resources which are 
likely to turn into larger conflicts. For example, the Caspian Sea itself is just one 
dispute in the region with respect to the United Nations Convention on Law of the 
Sea because the Caspian Sea is landlocked and its international position is still 
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contested, so states1 continue their claims for their shares in the offshore area (Klare 
2001, 88). In addition, the situation between the Southeastern Asian islands of 
Malaysia, Philippines and Brunei can be a good example to demonstrate the third 
issue-transportation. Because these states are so close to each other, they also have 
disputes over offshore areas, but the disputes over transportation on straits like 
Malacca are more likely. “First, the states that border on the area will undoubtedly 
seek to maximize their access to its undersea resources in order to diminish their 
reliance on imports. Second, several other East Asian countries, including Japan and 
South Korea, are vitally dependent on energy supplies located elsewhere almost all 
of which must travel by ship through the South China Sea” (Klare 2001, 111). To the 
disputes in the region, seven states are party: Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. As these several examples portray, energy security 
has been a constant concern in the conflict literature. 
 
In addition to these arguments about the relationship between energy and 
conflict, the literature also situates energywar in the context of general international 
relations theories. As clarified by Paul Williams (2007) realism, prospect theory and 
social constructivism can be used to explain how energy resources cause conflict. 
Most realists contend that there is a causal relationship between material scarcity and 
energy wars. Scarcity of material resources inclines states to dominate either 
resources or trade routes. This pursuit finite resource leads, in turn, to conflictual 
interaction patterns. “Military intervention in resource rich areas remains the ultima 
ratio of outcomes in the energy sector, as it does for great-power politics” (Williams 
                                                 
1
 These states are: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. “Iran and Russia seek joint 
development of all offshore areas (beyond a narrow coastal strip) by all five littoral states: the others 
seek to divide the entire Caspian into five seperate Exclusive Economic Zone; negotiations between 
the parties on the ownership of offshore drilling rights are continuing.” (Klare 2001, 229)  
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2007, 47). On the other hand, prospect theory has a different focus in comparison to 
realism. Prospect theory focuses on the decision making process through a 
modification of expected-utility models. It tries to examine the importance of status-
quo positions in the energy market and advises that producers need to continue the 
exporting process in a collective manner in order to protect the stability in the values 
of energy resources againist decreases in demands. On the other hand, the theory also 
suggests that consumer countries will focus on preserving the buyers market and 
rectifying any situation that may reduce supply (Williams 2007). Lastly, social 
constructivism supports that the energy resources are significant for states only 
because their usage has been socially defined, and that “material resources acquire 
particular meanings from being part of larger social structures, which also consist of 
shared knowledge and agent practices that (re)produce these structures” (Onuf 1989, 
285). 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The conflict literature included two levels of analysis in the conceptualization 
of conflict causes: system level and state level. System level of analysis examines 
power distribution and polarity as the conflict causes that realism and neorealism 
indicate, and alliance ties and their effects on the likelihood of conflict are explained 
using the (neo)realist theory as well as power transition, power cycle and hegemonic 
stability theories. In the state level, territorial contraints, contiguity, regime type, 
public opinion and complex interdependence are examined as conflict causes. After 
explanation of these factors that have been often studied in the literature, I focused 
on the states’ needs of energy security as the major cause of conflict. 
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As a final implication of the different aforementioned literature, it is quite a 
simplistic yet undeniable approach to conclude that energy resources and conflicts 
(both regional and global) are dramatically intertwined with each other, regardless of 
the states and/or energy source in consideration as long as there is a scarcity of the 
resource itself. The fact that nations require most, if not all, energy sources for their 
needs that are far too important to attain by other more economically or socially 
unfavorable means, results in a way in which nations choose a way out: conflict. The 
history has portrayed many times that such energy-based values and materialistic 
needs have been the key determining factors for nations’ political approach towards 
other nations, regions and sectors. When there is no scarcity, there tends to be a 
lower probability of such conflict arising between nations, though this fact does not 
eliminate the probability of a conflict erupting altogether. One cannot underestimate 
the importance of factors such as a nation’s allegiance along with its military power 
and prowess in regards with the rival nations’ similar qualities when trying to 
evaluate a possible conflict between the two; although it must be noted again that 
these factors, in no way whatsoever, totally eliminate the possibility of a conflict 
occurring at all. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
3.1 The Theoretical Framework 
 
Due to their widespread consumption, energy resources are vital for people in 
industrialized countries. Energy resources are crucial for industries not only for their 
use in manufacturing, but also in transportation of people, and all trade materials. 
This is true especially for the defense industry. In addition to this fact about energy 
resources, currently fossil energy resources –oil, gas and coal- have a share of 80% 
in the energy market besides alternative energy resources. Since the technology and 
investment on alternative resources are limited, and development of alternative 
energy technology depends on other resources, alternative energy resources are still 
not able to compete in the energy market. The increasing population in the world and 
the recent technological developments lead to the high demand on indispensable 
fossil energy resources (Choucri and North 1972, 86). Fossil energy resources are 
distributed unevenly throughout the regions and this asymmetric distribution brings a 
competition over them. Unlike coal, which can be retrieved from many regions, oil 
and natural gas resources are concentrated in certain parts of the globe. This uneven 
distribution of oil2 and natural gas resources in the world raise the concerns of states 
                                                 
2
 - Two third of proven oil reserves are in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab 
Emirates.  
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about security of energy supplies. Due to these reasons, the general concern of this 
thesis is based on oil and natural gas, since they are the resources likely to influence 
the foreign decision making processes in the world.  
 
I argue that the Iraq-Kuwait war of 1990 and the Operation Desert Storm are 
good examples of how and why energy concerns may lead to war, which helped me 
to derive the main insights of the theoretical framework. Iraq was one of the 
exceptional states in the Middle East region after a decade long Iran-Iraq war of 
1990. The intention was to maintain this situation and to continue to be ahead of all 
the other states in the region. Thus, Iraq aimed to conquer Kuwait, get its land, and 
obliterate the Kuwait government as well as the state. The underlying reason was 
energy; Iraq was after the energy resources that were possessed by Kuwait, and also 
was trying to resolve the border problems by invading Kuwait. Because, if Saddam – 
then the Iraqi President - could have achieved the goals that he had, this would mean 
that Iraq would be in control of 20% of the market share of oil reserves, and OPEC’s 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) production share (Yergin 1992, 
723). While Kuwait was strategically very important for Iraqi energy needs, Iraq was 
not the only country with these calculations. The US decided to use its force in the 
region through the Operation Desert Storm and prevented Iraq from invading all of 
Kuwait. A destructive energy war between Iraq and Kuwait was joined by the US, 
which turned out to guarantee only a fragile peace in the region.  
 
The case of Iraq-Kuwait war made me realize early on that energy resources 
are considerable as a cause of war because they are in the basis of all the economic 
activities in an industrialized state. For the satisfaction of citizens’ needs and 
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continuation of economic activities, leaders pay attention to imports of energy 
resources and policies about energy security. Moreover, this situation increases the 
dependency of the state on energy imports. In this sense, dependency on other states 
increases. Governments feel the necessity to establish strategies to access energy 
cheaply, from secure transportation methods, without any delay, to present them for 
their citizens’ consumption needs and to continue their economic activities (Cowhey 
1985; Humphreys 2005; Krapels 1993).  Especially states, which are dependent on 
export of energy (consuming countries), started to act more sensitively in their 
relations with regions, which are rich in energy resources, like the Middle East and 
Central Asia. To gain access to these resources, states risk their security priorities 
and even trigger tensions that have the possibility to turn into conflicts, if consuming 
states intervene to the oil rich parts of the world. Although in modern life, conflicts 
are costly and rarely feasible due to the risk of nuclear retaliation between nuclear 
states, sometimes the gains from the conflicts over energy resources exceed their 
costs, making the conflicts more likely, especially between states without nuclear 
power.  
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the classical realist theory posits 
that survival is the ultimate goal of a state and the needs for survival are also crucial 
while conducting relations with other states. When states cannot provide the 
resources they need from their own territories, they seek others to provide them, and 
in the event they face resistance, they tend to use all their capabilities to fulfill their 
needs. The energy competition situation assumed by this thesis is viewed from the 
perspective of different types of states with different levels of energy needs: 
consumer, producer and transit states. A decrease in the amount of fossil energy 
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resources and an increase in demand creates competition in the world energy market, 
thus in turn creating enemies among consuming states, which ultimately influences 
their relationships with producer states negatively. The states’ ways of handling this 
problem are different. Some take steps to minimize their use of these fossil energy 
resources, and try to develop technologies to use the alternative resources, whereas 
some choose direct intervention to oil-rich countries, both economically via 
multinational corporations and through military force.  
 
On the other hand, for the producers, guaranteeing the demand is crucial, 
while they also pay attention to monopolizing their energy market and to protecting 
territories that have huge reserves. Expectedly, for the producer states whose 
economies depend on the energy market, the situation is even more crucial. They 
either invest in alternative energy resources by employing their income from oil 
export like US and European Union focused in their energy security papers 
(Commission of European Communities 2006; The Department of Energy 
Organization 1998), or they try to create strategies for the development of new 
activities in economy. Also they get into conflicts with the neighboring states to have 
their crucial resources. Lastly, the transit countries try to protect their primacy in the 
trade ways to gain more and to develop their economies, and they aim to prevent 
others from changing the existing roads for trade. 
 
While I agree that a single cause cannot be the sole determinant of an 
international conflict and all other psychological, sociological, demographic, 
economic and political causes need to be investigated, I believe that the realist theory 
and the theoretical framework that I just explained better explain conflicts in the 
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contemporary world. The main argument of this thesis is that the effect of energy 
resources besides all other actors and effects matter because “… the dynamics of 
national expansion is that differential rates of population growth in combination with 
differential rates of technological growth contribute to international competition and 
sometimes to conflict, insofar, as competing nations have differential – grossly 
unequal- access to resource and capabilities” (Choucri and North 1972, 84). 
 
In the light of this theoretical framework, hypotheses will be examined to 
explain the influence of consumption and production of oil and gas resources on 
conflict. Prior to coming to these hypotheses, it is necessary to note that the focus of 
the theory is at the macro level. Most of the theories about energy wars are about 
scarcity, namely the energy scarcity of one specific state and argue that only 
consumer states go to war. Rather than focusing on the scarcity of energy resources 
in a statebased approach, in this thesis, the general foci will be the general scarcity 
happening in the world as explained above. It can be seen that my case studies are 
largely state-centric, but, the way I used to choose them includes the idea of general 
scarcity which increased in last decades. The first hypothesis is: as a state’s need of 
fossil energy resources increases, the likelihood and intensity of conflict increases. 
Taking only proven energy resources into account will not be enough to explain the 
need of fossil energy resources. Although the proven energy resources seem to be 
increasing year by year according to the BP statistical review, the demand is 
increasing more rapidly3. New technologies, investments, and discoveries are 
increasing the numeric data, but while proven energy resources increase, 
                                                 
3
 This information is present in the BP statistical review, which can be found in the BP website: 
http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 
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consumption also increases with an even more accelerating pattern. So, to be able to 
come up with the energy needs of the states, it is more logical to examine the 
interaction between consumption and production. It should be noted that there are 
states with huge amounts of proven resources, but they are not using any of those 
unless their consumption is larger than their resources (production). Such states have 
the chance to decide whether or not to export these resources to balance the demand 
and supply, but it can be seen that their near future projections are not showing any 
shift in their exports. The interaction between three variables-proven energy 
resources, production and consumption- points to the energy need of that state, and 
its standpoint in the energy market. Having a brief idea of a state’s energy situation, 
and that state’s conflict intervention, it is possible to explore the effect of energy 
resources on conflict. So, the hypothesis predicts that if a state’s need of energy 
resources increases, then that state can be more hostile and can easily engage in 
conflict.  
 
The second hypothesis which will be explored with comparative case study is 
on a Consumer and Producer dyad, which is more likely to end up in a fight in case 
of scarcity in the world. In other words, I expect that conflict is more likely when a 
problem arises between a consumer and a producer state. There are some consumer 
producer dyads which continue trading peacefully, but this only means that in that 
dyads the states are not influenced by the global scarcity because of the strong 
interdependence like US- Saudi Arabia example. It is thus possible to divide states as 
consumers and producers of energy. Producing energy resources does not necessarily 
make a state an exporter. The state needs to consume less than its production in order 
to be an exporter. For example, the US is still a major producer of oil with 6871 
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thousand barrels daily production on 2006 data in comparison to world’s 81663 
thousand barrels production, but is also the largest importer since they import 13612 
thousand barrels of oil daily, while in the world total import is only 52561 (BP 
2007). On the other hand, this logical link is also valid for the consumer. Consuming 
energy resources does not mean that the state is an importer. For example, Russia is a 
large consumer of gas with 432, 1 billion cubic metres (BP 2007), but is the world’s 
largest exporter with the export of 191 billion cubic metres of gas to world (EIA 
2007b). In order to be an importing state, a particular state needs to consume more 
than its production. It can be argued that in the historical wars like Iraq and Kuwait, 
and Iran and Iraq are producer-producer dyads, and examples to this hypothesis can 
be falsified. But, in this thesis, I am looking to the phenomena in a more global way 
and in comparison to my first hypothesis. Because of this reason, these conflicts are 
not in the date range of my cases.    
 
The third hypothesis involves the realist emphasis on major power conflict. 
The third hypothesis is: When one of the states in a dyad is a major power, the 
probability of conflict over energy resources increases if the major power is 
experiencing energy scarcirty and the other party can, but will not, help to ease that 
scarcity. The energy need of a major power is high in comparison to other states 
since power is determined by a state’s capability that also depends on a strong 
economy in which major industries in the state need considerable energy resources. 
In general, what this thesis tries to achieve through exploring these four hypotheses 
is to examine the energy market’s influence on international politics, especially on 
security issues rather than economics. 
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In addition to all these hypotheses, the fourth hypothesis focuses on the war 
initiators. It states that not only a consumer state initiates the war when the energy 
supply is cut off, but that an initiation of hostility can also originate from producing 
state because of the latter’s concerns over market primacy. With this hypothesis, the 
theory tries to focus on the scarcity on a global level rather than exploring states one 
by one, because in micro level –state-centered- explanation of the phenomena can 
only focus on a consumer state. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
In this section, conceptual and operational processes of the research design 
are discussed in detail. The variables will be conceptualized one by one starting with 
the dependent variable, independent variable and finally the control variables. After 
the examination of the variables and the research design process, case selection 
criteria will be discussed in detail.    
 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
  
Wars. Although the literature focused on the conflict, from this part on, the 
thesis will focus on a specific kind of conflict: war. Wars, which maybe considered 
as a stronger form of conflict, can be defined as “a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, 87). This definition of 
Clausewitz refers to the usage of other means of international relations to reach to an 
objective by two political entities with a continuing relationship. “These include 
diplomacy, trade, sanctions, financial inducements, espionage, threates and displays 
of force, alliance-building, propaganda, and so on” (Barkawi 2006, 36). In the theory 
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and case study, the strongest form of conflict, war, will be explored. The decision 
process for the cases of chosen conflicts will be explained below in section 3.2.4. 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables  
 
Deprivation of Energy Resources. As previously noted, the concept of fossil 
energy resources indicates common elements such as oil, gas and coal. It should be 
noted that the oil and gas distribution among the world is uneven, even though coal is 
distributed quite uniformly in comparison to their reserves and consumption. In 
addition, the concept of alternative energy resources includes both renewable 
resources as well as nuclear energy resources. Even though some states focus on the 
development and research on these resources, none of these states use these resources 
in a respectable amount. Due to such reasons, oil and gas reserves will be used in this 
thesis. In addition, the energy resources can be divided into two other categories, 
which are proven energy resources and potential energy resources. Although both 
terms are used in the energy literature, I will refer to the concept as proven energy 
resources throughout the text. “Proven reserves of oil– Generally taken to be those 
quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable 
certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing 
economic and operating conditions” (BP 2007, 6). The potential energy resources 
data are not available because it is hard to indicate what kind of a potential a territory 
has, considering that the potentials change according to the technological 
developments such as new technologies for drilling oil and so on. Thus, because it is 
impossible to prove the value that the experts are referring to as potential, it is not 
feasible to use that information in this research. Deprivation of energy resources, on 
the other hand, can be explained by proportioning the increase in the world 
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population with energy usage in the world versus world’s overall energy capacity. 
So, in this thesis, the deprivation of energy resources will be taken as independent 
variable and since I am using state-centric case studies in the comparative case study 
chapter, the energy status of a state will be taken into account in most different 
systems design. 
 
Major Power Presence.  The presence of a major power is another 
independent variable, since the presence of a major power in a dyad makes wars 
more probable. The involvement of a hegemonic power in a conflict is crucial 
because the costs of the war are hardly affordable for the small powers, thus 
discouraging any escalation of crises that may lead to war. Since in the realist 
literature, major power presence in the dyad is implied as a conflict cause, whether 
this variable is also important in the energy conflicts will be examined in this thesis.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
 
1) Territory  
2) Polity missions 
3) Regime/ Government 
4) Ethnicity 
5) Alliances 
6) Capability 
 
The literature discussed in Chapter II leads me to include these variables as 
the controls. Territory refers to “an attempt by the revisionist state to gain control 
over a piece of turf that it claims but does not effectively possess” (Jones, Bremer 
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and Singer 1996, 178). Secondly, by mentioning politics, Jones, Singer, and Bremer 
have focused on a revisionist state which wants to change the foreign policies of the 
other state (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 178).  The regime refers to “the desire 
by the revisionist state to change the government of other state” (Jones, Bremer and 
Singer 1996, 178). Taking ethnicity as a conflict cause; ethnicity is defined as people 
from different cultures, backgrounds, bodily appearance, language and so on belong 
to different ethnic groups and in case of any contradictions or conflicts between 
different groups exist. The Minorities at Risk Project, which is an extensive research 
program on minority groups and conflicts, explains ethnicity as a cause of conflict 
and divides ethnic groups with their intergroup differentials coded as “cultural, 
political and economic status or traits of the group with respect to the dominant 
groups. Differentials are objective differences between groups, as best as we can 
judge them” (Minorities at Risk Project 2005). When it comes to the alliances, the 
establishment of alliances leads to a more balanced international society, but lets the 
states take risks, and get aggressive against others; because they believe that they can 
get what they need with the support of their ally. Capability determines state’s 
power, resistance, and so the more the capable the states are; the less they try to 
avoid conflicts. “Power is considered by many to be a central concept in explaining 
conflict, and six indicators: military expenditure, military personnel, energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population” 
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). 
 
After explaining all the variables included in the research, to illustrate the 
selection process and to confirm that the thesis has an underlying systematic method, 
the research design will be further discussed below.  
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3.2.4 The Method: Comparative Case Study 
 
The comparative case study method with the most different systems design 
will be used in the thesis to the hypotheses of the thesis. Case studies are important in 
order to explain the underlying mechanism in the research, and they are useful to 
show the interdependent reasons lying behind the theory (Bennett 2004). While other 
methods like statistics show a general outcome from numerous cases, comparative 
case studies take some constant variables into consideration to explain the 
phenomena. With these cases, researchers have a chance to provide more detailed 
information to falsify their theory. Because of these reasons, the case study chapter 
will provide explanations about how the energy resources affect conflicts in the 
world by the help of two chosen dyads from the history in addition to a current 
conflict. 
 
Since my thesis discusses how the decrease in fossil energy resources 
influences the nature and presence of conflict in the modern sense; I based my 
research on the cases belonging to the post-Cold War period. Because threat of 
conflict over energy is increasing day by day (especially after the end of the Cold 
War) concern over these resources increased. Consequently, I examined all the 
interstate conflicts that occurred between 1989 and 2007.  
 
According to the literature, the conflicts in this time period are as follows: 
Laos-Thailand 1988  
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Panama-US 1989 
Iraq-Kuwait 1990- 1991 
Ecuador-Peru 1995 
Cameroon-Nigeria 1996 
Eritrea-Ethiopia 2000 
Iraq-Australia, United Kingdom, US 2003 
Azerbaijan-Armenia 1989 
India-Pakistan 2003 (Which proceeds in the post-cold war period) 
Lebonan- Israel 2006 
Russia- Georgia 2008 
 
These dyads have been chosen from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset 
(Gleditsch et all. 2002), which includes both the interstate and civil conflicts until 
2007. Because all other data sets include only the conflicts until 2001 and for the 
case study section, more recent conflicts are required; I categorized the conflicts into 
two as civil conflicts and interstate conflicts between 1990 and 2007, to have the 
most recent conflict data.  
 
Once all the interstate wars were listed in that period, I decided to compare 
Iraq- Australia, UK, US war with Russia-Georgia case. To select these cases among 
the others in the list, I used the ‘most different systems design’, where the core idea 
is choosing cases with all the same measures for control variables, and different 
values on the independent and dependent variables. This method enables researchers 
to come up with an idea about whether the cases are selected bias-free. “The most 
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different systems designs eliminate factors differentiating social systems by 
formulating statements that are valid regardless of the systems within which 
observations are made. As long as these statements continue to be true in all systems, 
no reference to systemic characteristics is made” (Przeworski, and Tenue 1970, 39) 
So, in comparison to other cases in the list, Russia-Georgia and US-Iraq cases are 
matching the criteria of most different systems design, since the values for these 
cases regarding all control variables are close to each other whereas the dependent 
and independent variables’ measures vary.  
 
Since the most different systems design is established with the relations 
between the variables, it is significant to determine all variables that will be used in 
the research design part. Regime type, territory, polity missions, ethnicity, major 
power status, alliances, capability, and trade will be used as control variables since, 
according to the literature; these are the core causes of conflict. All of these variables 
and their importance for the cases will be explained one by one, after examining the 
cases in detail. However, it is possible to argue that the cases have different accounts 
for independent and dependent variables. The dependent variable (war) and 
independent variables (fluctuation and scarcity of energy) have the same situation for 
both of the dyads. Both the Russia-Georgia dyad and the Iraq-US dyad are producer-
consumer dyads. Since one of the hypotheses is on how much more conflictual a 
producer-consumer dyad should be; this is a useful starting point. Since the second 
independent variable is major power presence, these two cases are also matching the 
criteria of having a major power presence in the dyad. For the dependent variable, it 
is obvious that both of the conflicts have turned into a war.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
After the previously mentioned reasons of the selection of the Russia- 
Georgia and Iraq-US dyad as cases to explain energy conflicts, in this case study 
chapter, both of the cases will be taken one by one and examined starting with their 
historical background. The generally accepted causes of the cases will be the focus 
before tackling the question of “Why energy is important?” In the last part, the two 
cases will be compared according to the control variables that have been chosen 
under the light of the literature review on conflict. 
 
 
4.1 US-Iraq War 
 
4.1.1 Historical Background 
 
The September 11 terrorist attacks were the turning point for the United 
States and its security perceptions, since it was the most unexpected attack the US 
faced in the post Cold War era. After the September 11 attacks, America focused on 
retaliation politics in this asymmetric war against the terrorists, and indicated that the 
Middle East and Central Asia were the core regions to solve the terrorism problem 
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due to the presence of Al-Qaeda in the region. The US indicated two core reasons as 
to why these regions were directly related to the terrorist movements: Radical Islam, 
and the states that were supporting radical Islamic terrorism (Bush 2002; Bush 
2002b; Cordesman 2004; Jamieson 2007). After the US surge in Afghanistan, these 
reasons directed the attention to Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime. United States 
pursued a preventive war strategy in order to use a one-sided initiative including a 
preemptive strike, rather than collective movements, to justify its actions in the 
Middle East. According to this preventive war strategy, America was able to decide 
what the threats were, and decide on its actions without the international society’s 
viewpoint. In addition, US started to see the states that were supporting terrorism as 
the holders of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and in case of necessity, 
believed to have the right to make preemptive strikes against these states as well. 
  
On the other hand, American claims over Iraq such as, “Iraq does not accept 
the regulations of the United Nations, Iraq has nuclear weapons and is developing 
them, and because of these reasons Iraq is a great danger for the stability of the 
region, and democratization in Iraq is crucial, Iraq has strong ties with Al-Qaeda…” 
(Arı 2004, 497) were means to try and shift the public opinion both in the United 
States and in the world.  
 
While these developments took place in the United States, United Nations 
was also focusing on the investigations over Iraqi territory, even if the Iraqi 
government was preventing them from conducting their investigations on weapons of 
mass destruction such as chemical weapons, as well as on the presence of ties with 
Al-Qaeda. With the passing of Resolution 1441 in 2002 (United Nations 2002), UN 
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called Iraq for a full cooperation with a deadline, but UN did not find the Iraqi 
response to the resolution satisfactory. After this resolution, the contradictory 
opinions over the issue of Iraq started to increase in the international community. 
France, Russia and China as Permanent Members of the Security Council, as well as 
Germany and Syria, as Temporary Members, were totally rejecting the idea of 
military intervention to Iraq while US, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Angola, 
Cameroon, Ghana, and Chile were in support of the military intervention to start a 
democratization process in Iraq (Arı 2004, 503). While the UN was trying to solve 
this crisis, the NATO member states were pondering over the same concerns. 
Although news of destroying weapons of mass destruction was coming from the 
Iraqi government, America decided in favor of the military intervention. The UN 
Security Council still approved the continuation of inspections in Iraq, as the then 
American Foreign Minister, Colin Powell was supporting the idea that Iraq was 
rejecting cooperation and that there was a strong need to retaliate and eliminate all of 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (Arı 2004, 504). 
 
Although United States did not get the approval of the Security Council and 
its other allies, it initiated an operation called “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 
cooperation with the United Kingdom. The American army’s air superiority was 
visible starting from day one of the operation. Security Council members France, 
Germany, Russia and China were continuing to declare their concerns, as well as 
announcing that the US needed to stop its operation (Arı 2004) .   
 
On March 20, 2003 initial strikes of Operation Iraqi Freedom started in 
Bagdat, directly againist Saddam Hussein and his sons (Kahl 2007). These strikes 
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targetting Saddam continued with the speculations of Saddam’s death in media until 
Saddam Hussein appeared on television, saying “You will be victorious Iraqi people” 
(BBC 2003). With the proof that Saddam Hussein was still alive, the threat of use of 
chemical weapons increased, and strong Iraqi resistance increased this possibility 
until March 25, 2003 (BBC 2003c). The US air and marine strikes started after that 
with ‘shock and awe strategy’, and with the Kurdish people’s help, the US military 
seized the oilfields (BBC 2003b). Media showed every detail of the war. The serious 
casualties that people witnessed in the media increased the concerns of the 
international society against US intervention and human rights violations in the 
region (Amnesty International 2003). Although the US army already controlled the 
capital, and the international airport, new airbombings caused several casualties. 
With airstrikes and the help of British troops, Basra resistance also lost power and 
the coalition forces collapsed the Iraqi regime and this collapse created a chance for 
Iraqis to lost ministries, houses, offices and schools (Reich 2003).  
 
When Kirkuk fell on April 10, Turkey warned coalition forces that they could 
not accept Kurdish control in this region. Saddam Hussein was captured near Tikrit, 
in late 2003 and US declared that Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded, and left Iraq 
governance to the Coalition Provision Authority to facilitate the elections and the 
Iraqi interim government had the power after that (BBC 2004).  
 
Although Iraqis elected the Transitional Government to create a permanent 
constitution in a democratic Iraq, the ethnic factions boycotted the new government, 
and communal strife in Iraq took a start (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005). In the same 
time period, the Iraqi court decided that Saddam Hussein would be charged for 
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actions of crimes against humanity and the execution of Saddam Hussein was 
realised right in front of the media in 2006, and this decision of the Iraqi court 
became quite controversial in the media (NewYork Times 2006). US increased the 
number of American troops in Iraq to stabilize the country and when the planned 
troop reduction started, and Bush government reduced its troops in Iraq (Jamieson 
2007).  
 
The Iraqi communal strife in addition to several terrorist attacks in the 
country still continues with less frequent American military movement in the 
country. Turkish war against PKK terrorism which has been extended to the 
Northern Iraqi territories since last year, and American forces which still fight 
against Al-Qaeda terrorism in Iraq show that Iraqi soil is unlikly to see peace coming 
in the near future (Jamieson 2007).          
 
4.1.2 Causes of War 
 
The causes of the US - Iraq conflict are divided into two categories in the 
literature: declared causes, and the claims of the scholars and some politicians. The 
declared causes are: (1) changing the regime and democratizing Iraq, (2) the struggle 
against terrorism, (3) Iraq’s capability to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and 
the removal of these capabilities in the name of world peace, (4) the human rights 
violations of the Iraqi government. On the other hand, the claims of scholars and 
politicians about the US intention are: (1) controlling the oil in the region, (2) 
protecting Israel, and (3) regaining its hegemony in the world (Gozen 2006). 
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Starting with the terrorist movements, United States declared Iraq to be in the 
“evil axis” according to its National Security Strategy. 
 
 While the United States Government and its allies have 
thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to stop them all. 
The terrorists have struck in many places, including Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. And they 
continue to seek WMD in order to inflict even more catastrophic 
attacks on us and our friends and allies.  
The ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist 
propaganda as a rallying cry (United States 2006). 
 
This idea comes from the claims of the US that Iraq had ties with the 
hijackers behind the September 11 attacks, and that Iraq was helping Al-Qaeda in 
weapons technology, as well as providing them with logistic support. In his 
declaration in 2002, George W. Bush explained that Iraq continued its actions against 
the US, helped terrorists, and that the United States would take all the necessary 
measures to prevent another attack by terrorists (Bush 2002). Although none of the 
United Nations’ government officers or military personnel could provide visible 
proof of terrorist intentions or weapons of mass destruction in the Iraqi territory, US 
decided to attack. The reason why any such proof was unclear could be because Al-
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein supported totally different ideologies. While Usame bin 
Laden had an ideology that supported Sharia – the Islamic Law and regulations- and 
radical Islam, Saddam Hussein was supporting the Baath ideology, which was a 
mixture of Arab Nationalism and Communism (Gözen 2006, 55).  
 
As a second reason for the conflict, it is possible to focus on the weapons of 
mass destruction. It has been known that the permanent five of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT): Russia, US, United Kingdom, France, and China have complied with 
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the NPT and did whatever was necessary against the states that were trying to 
develop new weapons of mass destruction (United Nations 2000). Before the 
invasion of Iraq, American policy makers assumed that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction, and advocated this assumption quite strongly, since this could be used as 
a cause of initiation of war. In a meeting of the United Nations in 2003, United States 
introduced evidence that Iraq had WMD with photos, videos and documents that 
were said to have been founded by the American intelligence services (Gözen 2006, 
57). The core concern about the WMD’s was again based on terrorist movements. 
United States was concerned with the threat that Iraq could share its WMD’s with 
terrorist groups. In case Iraq shared its WMD’s with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, 
retaliation for and deterrence of the usage of these weapons would be very costly, 
resulting in the idea that a preemptive strike was the best option. Nevertheless, after 
two years with troops in Iraq, it was clear that Iraq did not have WMD’s, and the 
American government declared that this misconception was the fault of the 
intelligence services and it misled the US and United Kingdom (Gözen 2006). 
 
The third declared cause of war was the goal of democratization of Iraq and 
installation of peace in the country. Because of the politics and ideology of Saddam 
Hussein, US argued that Iraqi citizens had been suffering for a long time, that 
Saddam’s policy was not only affecting the citizens, but also the Iraqi foreign 
relations with other countries, resulting in destabilization of the region. This reason 
was also set forth in order to legalize the attack and shift the public opinion. 
However, it is evident from the outcome that this intention was very difficult to 
realize. Although it may be argued that it was the first time a democratic election was 
held in Iraq in decades, all the indicators of democracy showed that the US’s 
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democratization attempt was not successful enough in Iraq and the mission of 
‘liberating the Iraqi people’ arguably failed. On the contrary, the intervention of the 
Bush administration in Iraq increased the inner-state pressures of governments and 
regulations in the other Middle Eastern States in the region (Clark 2003).    
 
On the other hand, the “real” causes, according to scholars, are different from 
what was declared. Some scholars argued that the Iraqi war was an American show 
of force as a world hegemon, and US needed to strengthen its power in the world 
after the 9/11 attacks. Because for America, having Iraq in hand meant that it was 
successfuly realizing the “Great Middle East Project”, and that it was becoming more 
powerful than its rivals such as China, Russia, and Europe in the field of world 
politics (Clark 2003). In addition, some scholars believed that the American actions 
in Iraqi territories can be attributed to a new imperialism policy; that US was looking 
for Iraq to be its new colony (Türken 2007). Lastly, some researchers focused on the 
importance of energy politics in the region, and America’s real intentions (Bulut 
2006). The effect of energy politics on this conflict will be explained in the following 
section.  
 
 
 
4.1.3 Why is energy a better explanation? 
 
At the end of the Cold War, the importance of fossil energy resources 
increased because almost all states in the world moved to a market economy. The 
Cold War had increased the value of Russia and stabilized the status of Russia over 
the Caspian Sea, because after the Cold War, the usage of energy resources increased 
but the trade of such resources was still limited in global ranges –in long distance 
52 
transformations. Market economy showed that the demand for the goods were so 
wide and that the supply was not enough, thus US decided to show and increase its 
hegemony by attaining control over such resources. These improvements in world 
politics can be starting point to understand why the Bush government’s policy turned 
into a policy of oil dependency (Alkadiri and Mohamedi 2003; Arı 2004; Bekker 
2004 ;Bulut 2006).   
 
As it is already examined, fossil energy resources are intertwined with our 
daily life, because they are used in medical industry, cosmetics, electronics, defense 
industry and so forth. Because of their widespread usage in all industries, fossil 
energy resources have shared a respectable portion in the markets of the 20th 
century. In addition, from the perspective of American foreign policy making, US 
consumes approximately 25% of the total oil production in the world, while 
importing over half of this total number- the US imports roughly 12-13 million daily 
barrels, about 60-65% of its total consumption, so US imports account for 15% or so 
of world production (BP 2008). Although United States was trying to decrease the oil 
dependency, and divide the sources with new strategies, the future projections are 
showing that the oil imported from the Middle East region can be accounted for 
nearly 50% of all the oil imported to the US. On the other hand, the Middle East 
region holds nearly 65% of the world’s proven energy resources (Klare 2004, 93). 
All of these reasons can be an explanation to the question as to why US is trying to 
adopt an agressive policy in the Middle East.  
 
The common national security strategy towards 2001 has identified 
increasing oil production and supporting the security in the Persian Gulf as its core 
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points (The Department of Energy Organization, 1998). Because of US’s 
dependency on the region, it has been in need of securing the region and increasing 
the production through these means. However, the Iraqi government had been acting 
against American energy interests. That is why, according to some scholars, that in 
order to increase the oil production, the foreign policy decisions have been focused 
on the overthrowing of the Saddam regime and the creation of a new government in 
favor of Western style governing methods (Klare 2004, 101). Control of Iraqi oil is 
not only important for controlling the profit and all the incomes coming from the 
petroleum industry, but also for enabling the American government to control the oil 
prices in the world, and thus once again increasing the American dollar (Arı 2004, 
498).  Apart from the fact that the oil dependence of China, Japan and Europe is 
increasing, US believes that it needs to control the oil to control the world (Arı 
2004), and with the control of oil reserves in the Middle East, US will successfully 
decrease its own dependency to the states which have political controversies such as 
Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela (The Department of Energy Organization, 1998). 
 
On the other hand, energy is highly important from the perspective of Iraqi 
government, too. The “Dutch disease” term is significantly related to this issue. In 
the 1960’s, the Netherlands had huge natural gas reserves, but these gas reserves 
weakened the economy, in contrast to general expectation that energy resources 
would increase the economy’s potential. In the literature, this “Dutch Disease” term 
explains the states’ problems whose economy is dependent on one energy resource 
(Bulut 2006, 347). These Middle Eastern countries’ economies are also dependent on 
oil or gas and although this monopoly increased welfare in these countries, the other 
sectors have considerably lost their importance. “Political Dutch disease” is a term 
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that explains a governmental system in which the oil or gas owners govern the state 
either as an aristocracy or a tyrant. The situation was similar in Iraq with the Saddam 
Hussein government. Although Iraq was rich in terms of oil and gas, because there 
was no investment in other sectors than oil, gas and armament, there was no evidence 
as to an increase in the national economy. Iraq’s lack of control over its own 
economy also encouraged the US to intervene (Cordesman 2004; Gözen 2006).  
 
Besides all these explanations, it can be said that the intention of the US was 
also originated from the multinational energy companies based in the US. This is 
because just in 1972 before the US-Iraq war, these multinational energy companies 
were forced to stop their works in Iraq, and move back to their countries by Saddam 
(Iraqi Governor) himself. Since the energy companies lost their share in Iraqi market, 
in which the extraction of energy resources was cheap, the ability to reach high 
quality resources was easy and the supply amount was respectable, they started 
lobbying, acting secretly in American government to take their shares back, and to 
gain the control of Iraqi oil reserves. So, the war in Iraq was also influenced by the 
movements of multinational oil companies’ lobbies.    
 
To sum up, for the US, among all other causes, oil was the most crucial one. 
In this case, there was an oil-rich country on the one side; and states with powerful 
armies and economies on the other. For a state with a powerful army and economy, 
but dependent on oil resources for all these sectors, there is nothing more realistic 
than trying to control an oil rich country’s reserves. This was US’s major goal, as 
well as the strategy of all other powerful consumer states. “The last Iraq war was 
triggered with a tendency of attaining oil. Although there are various deaths in the 
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war, the income of oil companies have been guaranteed” (Bulut 2006, 351). Energy 
can be accepted as the main cause of the US- Iraq conflict, although American 
political figures have constantly rejected this idea. 
 
 
 
4.2 Russia-Georgia War 
 
4.2.1 Historical Background 
 
Georgia has been a crucial place in history because of its geopolitical location 
in the world; being a direct passageway between Anatolia, Persia, Russia, the Black 
Sea and the Caspian Sea. Thus, Georgia has been a home to attacks coming from 
Russia, Rome, Persia and the Ottoman Empire after 1800. In 1800, the authority was 
passed to the Russian Tsar and stayed under the Tsar’s control until Georgia declared 
independence in 1918. But this dream of an independent Georgia did not last long. In 
1922, after the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Red Army invaded Georgia, 
making it a part of the USSR (Nodia 1995).  In 1936, Georgia became a district 
under the USSR. On the other hand, North and South Ossetia were not yet separated 
and were a part of the USSR as Ossetia until 1922, when Stalin divided it into two, 
where North Ossetia was given to Russia, while South Ossetia became a part of 
Georgia. In 1936, North Ossetia became independent with of the support of Georgia 
(Hunter 2006). In 1988, with the encouragement of the glasnost policy of Gorbachev, 
South Ossetia wanted to reunite with North Ossetia, but because of the increasing 
nationalism in Georgia, along with the importance of territorial integrity, this request 
was rejected. 
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Georgia stayed under the USSR authority until 1989, after which it began 
declaring demands of autonomy. Separatist movements in the South Ossetia region 
started in this time period. Russia accepted Georgia’s demands of independence 
because it was using Russian sources, and making Georgia independent was going to 
balance Russia’s economy, and Russia was not in favor of dealing with South 
Ossetians anymore (Nodia 1995). However the clashes continued for two years with 
serious casualties, since Georgia was not in favor of the independence of the South 
Ossetians. In 1991, Georgia became independent and in 1992, Russian troops were 
deployed to South Ossetia, but around the same time fighting broke out in Abkhazia. 
Until 2001, Georgia maintained its stability, but new clashes started in 2002 in 
Abkhazia (Trenin 2007). In 2003, the Rose Revolution took place in Georgia without 
any bloodshed, and Mr. Saakasviili, a pro-western president, came to power in 
Georgia, and started reforms in Georgia.   He proposed autonomy to the Ossetians 
inside Georgia but they rejected it and asked for independence in 2005.  
 
Besides Georgia’s relations with South Ossetians, Georgia was dissatisfied 
with the Russian intervention to its domestic problems, and focused on the removal 
of Soviet troops from the country, and on efforts that resulted in the signing of a 
treaty with Moscow that agreed to remove Russian troops from Georgia in the end of 
2008 (Trenin 2007). In 2006, Georgia further demanded that Russia withdraw its 
peacekeeping forces from both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and agree to change 
them with international peacekeeping forces. Russia chose to continue its sanctions 
over Georgia. Consequently, South Ossetia made a referendum that demanded full 
independence, and this movement was introduced as Russian campaign and it stroke 
one more conflict between the belligerents (Hunter 2006). Georgia was mostly right 
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about its claim of Russian campaign, because most of the separatist movements in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the past were realized with the help and support of the 
Russians (Nodia 1995). 
 
When it comes to this year’s developments, in March 2008, Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence followed by its acceptance by the world encouraged 
South Ossetia, and after seeing that Russia was also supporting the independence 
claim, South Ossetia invited the world to recognize the region as a sovereign state. 
Although Georgia once more offered to share the power in governance with 
autonomy, South Ossetia insisted on full independence, again with the support of the 
Russian Federation (Birch 2008). This was followed by clashes between the 
Georgian government and the South Ossetian rebels. In August 7, President 
Saakasvilli decided on an air bombing over North Ossetia, and launched it in a 
parallel time period with the ground attack to South Ossetia. This became a great 
chance for Russia to realize plans over Georgia, and it invaded Georgia claiming that 
the South Ossetians and Russian citizens were under attack (Naughton and O’flynn 
2008). Although a ceasefire has been declared on August 12 in Georgia by the 
Russian Federation, the news have shown that the conflict and the bombing process 
continued in the region after the ceasefire (Birch 2008) 
 
 
4.2.2 Causes of War 
 
The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia initially had ethno regional 
and political grounds; the issue was destabilizing Georgia, which is why the crises 
always received Russian support (Nodia 1995). The core reason of the crisis was 
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directly ethnicity based – South Ossetians wanted to unite with North Ossetians and 
form an independent state –, but the Russian interventions always changed the nature 
of the conflict in the region.  
 
According to the literature on international conflict, identity problems that 
stemmed in ethnicity, religion, language issues etc. have always been accepted as 
causes of civil conflicts while they may also be accepted as the causes of interstate 
conflicts. Conflicts over identity have been common since different identity groups 
feel threatened by any other identity group.  At the end of the Cold War, nationalism 
was once again awakened and conflicts between ethno national communities 
increased due to the fact that these groups started to demand autonomy (Riggs 2007), 
and the South Ossetian movement can also be accepted as one of these nationalist 
movements. Starting by the ethnic division in the region, Georgia consists of 70% 
Georgians, 8% Armenians, 6% Russians, 6% Azeris, 3% Ossetians and 2% 
Abkhazians (Hunter 2006). The Abkhazians in the world were mostly located in the 
Abkhazia area in Georgia, but the situation was not the same for Ossetians. Most of 
the Ossetians were located in North Ossetia rather than South Ossetia. Although 
South Ossetia consisted of a population less that 1/3 of the Georgian population, 
Ossetians living there made up only 3% of the overall population; in addition, 
although Georgians and Ossetians had strong ties by 1989, the political climate of 
nationalist movements in 80’s encouraged ethnic movements for the demand of 
independence. It was not easy for Georgia to let go one part of their territory, 
especially when that part was situated in the “heart of the country”, in the Russian 
border, as well as being the core place for smuggling (Freese 2005).   
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The reason that has been outlined above was the core reason of conflict in the 
1980’s, but the current conflict between South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia has 
different triggering points from different perspectives. For South Ossetia, the causes 
were mainly the ethnic differences, the support of Russia for their own demands of 
independence, and the already existing tension in the region. However, Russia and 
Georgia had different intentions. For Russia, the core reason was the dissatisfaction 
that the recent NATO enlargement process had created in the country. Although 
NATO was established against the Warsaw pact states, after the end of the Cold War, 
member states decided to enlarge their security structures throughout post-
communist states, beginning with Romania and Bulgaria (NATO 2008). The 
membership of Romania and Bulgaria had displeased Russia, but the possibility of 
membership of Ukraine and Georgia created a larger dissatisfaction, since after the 
membership of these two countries, Russia would be the only state who would not be 
a member to NATO in the Black Sea region (Laçiner et all. 2008). This işssue –being 
the only country without NATO membership for Russia- created perception of threat 
for Russia, which led to a belief that. the neighboring states would unite against it. 
The West would get its support in regional disputes, and Russia would loose its 
chance to be a regional hegemon, and thus influence the regional states. So, 
preventing Georgia from becoming a member of NATO was the core intention of 
Russia, which would also send a highly significant message to Ukraine as well.    
 
With the help of the NATO candidacy and close relationships with the US, 
the military presence of US in Georgia increased significantly (Bhadrakumar 2008). 
This continuing domination of pro-western ideas in the Georgian government was 
also increasing the dissatisfaction of Russia in the region, since it was changing 
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Russian dominance in the Caucasus. I believe that the aim of gaining the control of 
Caucasus, especially over strategic trade and energy routes was also important for 
Russia. Russia had desires to remove Georgian troops and deploy their own troops to 
parts of Georgia, while looking for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
(Laçiner et all. 2008). Finally, Russia wanted a change in the regime of Georgia, 
mainly due to Saakasvilli’s pro-western presidency, and set up a pro-Russian 
government in Georgia to change Georgian politics in the region.  
 
On the other hand, Georgia had some other goals in the crisis, although it has 
been seen as the victim by many. The delay in the NATO membership raised 
Georgia’s security concerns (Birch 2008), and it believed that a crisis would increase 
the pace of the process of membership to NATO. The political situation in Georgia 
was also forcing Saakasvilli to take action for the problematic regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Apparently, when he came to power during the Rose Revolution, 
Saakasvili had promised to solve the problems in these separatist regions of the state 
(Laçiner et all. 2008). Besides these intentions, increasing American support to 
Georgia, increasing support of neighboring countries in the region encouraged 
Georgia for retaliating against South Ossetia, and since its investments increased the 
military capability, Georgia attained self-reliance (Cohen 2008; Macintyre 2008; 
Naughton and O’flynn 2008)  . But she was where the problem raised; they could not 
calculate the Russian power and their reaction in the crisis.  
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4.2.3 Why is energy a better explanation? 
 
According to newspapers like International Herald Tribune (Birch 2008), 
Times Online (Macintyre 2008) and Asian News (Bhadrakumar 2008), Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has been accepted as a key reason for Russian offensive 
movements in the Georgia-South Ossetian clashes, mainly because this pipeline was 
reducing the Western dependence to Russian oil, thus weakening Russia’s hand in 
international politics. Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is a consortium project led by the 
British Petroleum. It is mainly a crude-oil pipeline which extends as far as 
1,768 kilometers from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (BP 2008) and with 
this length it is the second largest pipeline in the world after the North TransGas 
pipeline which is between Russia and Germany. The core importance of this pipeline 
both for the consortium, BP, the countries through which it passes, Europe and the 
US was that this pipeline was letting the Azerbaijani, Caspian oil reach the open 
seas, thus decreasing the monopoly of the Russian oil in the world.       
 
Firstly, discussing the significance of this pipeline for the European Union 
(EU) will be a good starting point. As outlined in the last Green paper, EU prioritizes 
six areas: competitiveness in the internal market in the energy sector, diversification 
of the supplies, solidarity to prevent the energy crises, sustainable development, 
innovation and technology and external policies (Commission of the European 
Communities 2006). For both long term and short term energy security objectives, 
EU is trying to provide sustainability of the supply, and is coordinating the 
investments in the energy sector. In addition, for the diversification of the energy 
supplies, it is obvious that EU sees Russia as a good partner, but is also moving 
towards the Caspian region for energy resources as well as alternative renewable 
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energy resources. EU imports most of its energy needs from Russia thus is quite 
dependent on Russia, which in turn makes Russia more powerful over EU in realist  
perspective. Although some scholars and Russian governors believe that this is not a 
one way dependency, and that it is becoming reciprocal dependency; EU has begun 
to see BTC as a great starting point for the energy routes’ diversification 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006). “Europe is one of the main 
customers of oil coming through the south Caucasus pipelines as they were set up in 
a bid to make the West less dependent on supplies from Russia, which has shown a 
willingness to close the taps in disputes with other ex-Soviet States in recent years” 
(Deutsche Welle 2008).  For EU, this pipeline opens the way to the Caspian energy 
without any need for Russia or Iran, making them view the pipeline as a way of 
freedom from Russian and Middle Eastern oil.  
 
On the other hand, for Georgia, and all the other Central Asian states, the 
BTC pipeline can also be explained as freedom from Russian energy hegemony. 
Since after the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the USSR, Russia has always 
tried to continue its relationship with the post-communist states, while trying to 
protect its power design over these states and for Georgia. This was the first 
undertaken movement for independence from Russia, with the encouragement of US, 
Europe and Turkey. “Despite the fact that Georgia itself does not produce oil (BP 
2008), the country is a key transit point for crude oil and gas exports from Azerbaijan 
to markets in the West (Commission of the European Communities 2006)” (Deutsche 
Welle 2008).  
 
63 
As a strategy, Russia had used a new path in the last decade to make the 
dependent countries more dependent on itself. While the dependent countries are 
trying to diversify their energy routes and supplies, Russia began signing treaties 
with former Soviet territories in the Caspian region, making sure that dependent 
countries would not import any energy resources without its permission, to make 
them more dependent on itself. For example, Russia made a gas agreement with 
Turkmenistan that guaranteed Turkmenistan to sell its gas resources only to Russia 
(Bhadrakumar 2008). This was a good exchange for the Caspian countries too, 
because they were also guaranteeing their demand, although they had a fixed price. 
Control over resources, pipelines and long-term contracts enabled Russia to have the 
smart power4 of energy which aggregates soft and hard power rather than hard power 
of military and soft power of diplomacy. So, the actions of Georgia and the 
construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline was totally against Russia’s 
interests, which had been identified for years, and Russia was in a need of retaliation 
against Georgia (Pagnamenta 2008). If Russia let Georgia continue this path, this 
would mean that their gain from energy sector will decrease, as well as signaling the 
other Central Asian states under control of Russian energy policies to move to their 
own routes, thus decreasing Russian power in the region. Russia wanted either to 
disrupt the pipeline, or the stability in the region to cut the deliveries from the 
pipeline, because such an action would force Europe back to Russian energy 
resources which are more stable, once again increasing Europe’s dependence on 
Russia (Laçiner et all. 2008). The increase of Russian domination over Georgia 
would also lead to Russian domination over energy routes, with a Georgian 
                                                 
4
 Smart power is a term created by Joseph Nye to enlarge the soft power idea. According to Nye, 
smart power is “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy” (Nye 2008; 
Nye and Coutu, 2008) 
64 
government supporting Russia, the Caspian Sea region would be under control of 
Russian Government again. This would make the diversification of energy routes 
impossible especially for Europe and thus the United States.  
 
To explain all these intentions of Russia, we must refer to the past events 
which Russia was engaged by the means of using the process tracing method. Two 
main events in Russian contemporary history can be good examples for this 
situation: The Russian Agreements with some Central Asian states to ensure its 
monopoly in the region, and the attempt to cut off Ukrainian energy supply. Russia 
has been using energy resources as a “weapon”, “soft power” in the region with these 
attempts. Starting with the agreements that Russia has undertaken around the Central 
Asia, Wallender explains that “Russian energy negotiations with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and China have yielded exclusive contracts for Russian 
enegy exports at higher prices, agreements for Russian control over strategic 
pipelines and even joint investment arrangements for Russian companies abroad” 
(2007, 107). These developments can be seen as a good sign for the changing foreign 
policy course of Russia, which has become more and more energy oriented in recent 
years. 
 
Moscow has used its importance in global energy markets to fracture 
the EU’s commontrade policies; to limit its neighbours’ willingness to 
pursue political and security relations that Russia opposed (influencing 
Ukraine’s new retiance on NATO membership, for example): to lay 
the groundwork for multifaceted cooperation with a rising China; and 
to create leverage for Russia’s entry into the global economy as an 
investor and owner (Wallender 2007, 111) 
 
These quotations can explain the Russian viewpoint through the world 
especially to Europe with energy as a tool of power.  
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As a second attempt of Russia’s new foreign policy, the cut off of gas to 
Ukraine can be another good event to explain the historical process of the decisions. 
The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas transformation and gas prices 
started in 2005, since Ukraine accused Russia of putting unbalanced gas prices to 
different countries. After nearly one year of dispute between Russia and Ukraine, 
Russia cut gas exports to resolve the dispute, but it was clear that this movement was 
a way of showing energy as a force to the neighboring countries and Europe. 
Because, as it is clarified by Stern, “The Ukranian gas pipeline system plays a large 
role as an intermediary connecting Russia with growing European markets, and 
Ukraine itself is an importer of Russian Gas” (2006, 11). In addition, since Ukraine 
started to buy gas from Turkmenistan, Russia felt threatened that it might lose its 
monopoly over gas resources. With respect to these two examples, it was obvious 
that Russia has been using energy as a tool of power, and in Russia-Georgia war, 
Russia again used energy as a source of conflict.  
 
 
4.3 Comparison of The Two Cases 
 
In the comparison part, the independent variables will be explored one by 
one, the theoretical structure will be focused on each case, while four hypotheses and 
their implications will also be analyzed. The order will be done with the focus of 
most different systems design. 
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As one of the independent variables, deprivation of energy resources will be 
the first focus of comparison. Since the theory is focusing on deprivation at the 
system level, I compared the consumption and production accounts of total world 
yearly oil (BP 2007). Simply put, there is increasing inequality in the production 
consumption relations, while consumption is increasing in a faster rate. If we focus 
on the Table 1, it can be easily seen that world’s production has not satisfied the 
world’s demand since 1980’s because, according to BP statistical review, the 
difference between production and consumption becomes negative after this period. 
Besides, with the same statistical review, comparing the proven reserves on 2006 
(1208,2 thousand million barrels) with consumption in the same year (83719 
thousand barrels) – only in case there is no change in energy consumption- these 
proven reserves can only be sufficient for approximately 39 years (BP 2007). 
However, with the evident yearly increase in the energy consumption, 39 years is 
actually an optimistic projection, because of the increasing numbers of consumption 
yearly, and decreasing investments on oil and natural gas. With these projections, it 
can be said that general scarcity is increasing in the global range in the long-term. 
This situation cannot be enough on its own to explain the aggression of Russia and 
US in 2003 and 2008, but there seems to be a relationship since their concerns over 
fossil energy resources are increasing year by year.  
 
       
  
 
 
TABLE 1: TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF OIL (BP 2007) 
 
  
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
TOTAL WORLD 
Production- thousand 
barrels 31803 48061 55825 62946 57469 65470 68125 75033 74932 74496 77056 80244 81250 81663 
TOTAL WORLD 
Consumption- thousand 
barrels 31240 46066 54991 61731 59384 66830 69830 76280 76828 77737 79158 81898 83080 83719 
Total World Production- 
Consumption 563 1995 833 1215 -51915 -1360 -1706 -1248 -1896 -3242 -2102 -1655 -1829 -2056 
                                                 
5
 It can be easily seen that after 1985, the difference between production and consumption becomes negative which creates statistical discrepancies and showing that 
consumption is exceeding the supply. BP explains these discrepancies with the stocks because they are explaining that the overconsumption is provided from the stocks of 
the states. For example, US used their stocks to close the gap between their consumption and production.  The stock numbers can be seen in BP Statistical Review (2008)  
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On the other hand, the second independent variable, the presence of major 
power is easier to explore in a dyad, because the State System Membership list and 
its sublist about major powers, which is created under Correlates of War Project, can 
be useful to prove which state is a major power (Correlates of War 2008). According 
to this dataset, US, and Russia were accepted as major powers, in the time period of 
the US- Iraq, and the Russia- Georgia Wars.  After establishing the values of 
independent and dependent variables, the focus on most different systems design is 
significant.  
 
TABLE 2: The Most Different Systems Design 
 
 
 US-Iraq Russia-Georgia 
Independent Variable   
Status of Energy 
Resources 
Consumer- Producer Dyad Consumer- Producer 
Dyad 
Major Power Presence US (Present) Russia (Present) 
Dependent Variable   
War War War 
Control Variables   
Territory Not neighbours 
(Territorially Distant) 
Neighbours  
(Territorially 
Approximate) 
Regime/Government Democracy- Autocracy 
Dyad 
Democracy- Democracy 
Dyad 
Ethnicity No influence of ethnicity Influence of ethnicity in 
Ossetia 
Alliances Not in a same regional 
alliance formation 
In a same alliance 
formation (CIS-
Commonwealth of 
Independent States, 
OSCE- Organization for 
Security and Cooperation 
in Europe) 
Capability The gap between 
capabilities is wide but 
since Iraq has used 
chemical and biological 
weapons before, there was 
a possibility Iraq had them. 
The gap between 
capabilities is wide  
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The Table 2 explains the general outlook of the most different systems 
design. In this part, all the control variables that have been compared will be 
examined to see all the points in clearer way. Starting by the territorial situation of 
the two cases, it can be said that territorial proximity is an important cause of conflict 
according to literature, and it gives states a chance to increase their interests in the 
region, and rather than focusing on peaceful solutions to a crisis and making relative 
gain possible, neighbouring countries prefer absolute gains by converting crises into 
conflict. So, territorially proximate states are more likely to engage in a conflict. In 
my cases, while US and Iraq dyad embodies a considerably large territorial distance, 
in the Russia and Georgia dyad, the states are neighbours. With this respect, it can be 
said that territorial proximity is not always the cause of conflict: while it can be 
influential in Russia and Georgia case, but had no effect on US- Iraq case.  
 
Then, the differences in the regime/government type, as a core conflict cause 
in the liberal international conflict literature, are significant. Conflict theory focuses 
on the differences in regime types; different regimes in a dyad are more likely to 
fight than a joint democracy dyad. Between my cases, while the US-Iraq dyad is 
democracy-authoritarian, the Russia- Georgia dyad is democracy-democracy. My 
second case, Russia- Georgia dyad can easily show the idea that this premise of 
liberal conflict theory is a false premise. I agree with the realist literature, which 
argues that the liberal democratic peace proposition is based on a false premise; it is 
not the regime type but only common interests that lead to democratic peace (Gowa 
2000). Consequently, I believe that regime type cannot be accepted as a proper 
explanation for these two cases.  
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Ethnic diversity is another factor that is accepted as a conflict cause. Ethnicity 
is mostly influential in civil wars but sometimes it can be effective in interstate wars 
too. In US- Iraq war, the causes of the conflict is totally unrelated to ethnicity, since 
the etnicities the Americans and Iraqi people have no influence on each other directly 
and they have no interest in the ethnic make-up of the other side. On the other hand, 
in Russia and Georgia war, although there is no ethnic conflict between Russian and 
Georgians, the South Ossetian region, and Ossetians are becoming problematic 
between the two regions. However, the Ossetians are not Russian, and since the 
conflicts over identity become more possible in case members of these different 
groups feel threatened by the other group, there is no reason for Russians to feel 
threatened with Georgian movements through their own identity. Although there is 
strong influence of ethnic identity issues in the Russia- Georgia war, it can be said 
that ethnic differences cannot be the core reasons that lead to war.     
 
Moreover, alliances, another control variable of the theory, are believed to 
deter war by stabilizing the military capabilities according to some international 
relations scholars like Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan (1973). Between these cases in 
that causality, the Russia Georgia case should not have been a war, since they are the 
members of same regional institution CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), 
they need to be more peaceful to each other. On the other hand, the US and Iraq have 
no common ground to stabilize their capabilities. With this viewpoint, the US and 
Iraq war can be explained but, Russia and Georgia conflict should not have led to 
war and since the alliance they are stabilizing their capability. But as it is explained 
in the realist theory, the only core reason can be the interest for a state to go to a war, 
and alliances have limited effect on limiting conflicts.   
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Lastly, the differences between capabilities of states have been explained in 
the theories of balance of power, power transition, hegemonic decline, and long cycle 
theories and these different theories agree on differences in the power capabilities of 
states that affect the likelihood and frequency of war. Capabilities can be explained 
with iron steel production, energy consumption, military expenditure, military 
personnel and total population and with the composite index of national capability 
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). In the US- Iraq case and Russia and Georgia 
case, the gaps between the capabilities of states was wide in the time of the war, the 
distance was not only in the energy consumption, but also in military personnel, 
population and composite index of national capability. For example, while US had 
0.1497016 point in composite index of national capability and Russia had 0.0545499, 
Iraq’s index counted as 0,0067016 and Georgia’s 0,005777 (Singer, Bremer and 
Stuckey 1972). However, the significant situation and the difference about the US-
Iraq war was that since Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) like chemical 
weapons which Saddam used against his own citizens in 1988, Iraq had the chance to 
retaliate US with the threat of having and using WMD’s. This possibility of presence 
of WMD’s was giving Iraq a chance to compare capabilities with US.    
 
After explaining and comparing the cases with the most different systems 
design, I am going to focus on the hypotheses, and explore them in the cases, with all 
their implications.  Starting by the first hypothesis, a state’s increasing need of fossil 
energy resources, which can be calculated by the proportion of production of that 
state with consumption of these resources by the same state, increases the likelihood 
of conflict; it is possible to examine the cases with checking the measures of the 
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state’s consumption and production data. When energy resources are compared, 
while US and Georgia are both consumer states, Russia and Iraq are producer states 
according to the calculations from the BP Statistical Review data (2008). US, as a 
consumer country, produces 6879 thousand barrels daily, according to the 2007 data, 
its consumption  on oil is 20698 thousand barrels daily which creates an economic 
imbalance and strong need for importing the energy resources. This situation is 
nearly same for Georgia as a consumer country, although Georgia’s case is not as 
dramatic as that of the US. On the other hand in Iraq, the oil production is nearly 
2145 thousand barrels daily, and the consumption is so limited because of the chaos 
in Iraq, the industries are not working appropriately, according to 2007 records. 
Russian situation is a little different in comparison to other cases, Russia is a 
producer and exporter county both in oil and gas, and the production in gas is more 
crucial for Russian market. Russia has a daily production record of 9551 thousand 
barrels of oil, and 57.9 billion cubic feet of gas, while the daily consumption figures 
are only 2753 thousand barrels of oil, and 39.2 billion cubic feet of gas.  
 
Expectedly, both state dyads experience conflict caused by energy resources, 
since one of the hypotheses states that producer-consumer dyad is more likely to 
fight and these two consumer-producer dyads have engaged in conflicts with a 
reason of energy resources. This lead me to my fourth hypothesis, not only a 
consumer state initiates war in case the energy supply is cut off, but that a hostility 
initiation can originate from a producing state because of the concerns over market 
primacy. In the US- Iraq war, we can see easily the first situation, a consumer state 
initiates war because their energy usage is so huge and production is limited, and 
they have been trying to find means to reach energy resources in a cheap and easy 
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way. Saddam’s movement to stop the oil trade just before the US-Iraq war can be 
significant support for this argument. In April 8, 2002, Saddam declared that he 
would cut the oil exports and that Iraqi government decided “to stop oil exports 
completely as of this afternoon, 8 April, via pipelines going to the Turkish port on 
the Mediterrenean and via our ports in the south for a period of 30 days” (BBC  
2002). This attempt of Saddam to cut off the US’ and world’s oil supply can explain 
why US found war as a viable option to reach the energy. In the Russia-Georgia war, 
the latter situation can be illustrated: A producer state initiates war due to its rise of 
concerns over market primacy.  
  
Besides these hypotheses, my comparative case study shows that energy wars 
are also correlated with major power status and the third hypothesis, major power 
presence in a crisis increases the likelihood of energy conflict, can explain the 
situation properly. In my theory, I argue that major power presence in a dyad 
increases the probability of conflict over energy resources. In the first dyad, US-Iraq 
war, US, as a major power and a consumer country, initiates the war with energy 
concerns, and the second dyad, Russia- Georgia war, Russia as a major power and 
producer country initiates the war with the concerns of the trade routes and its 
monopoly over resources in the region. It can be said that whether the state is 
consumer or producer, being a major power helps that state to engage in energy 
conflict.  
 
The significance of energy resources on conflict became clearer with the help 
of these two cases: Iraq-US and Russia-Georgia, in which the realist expectations of 
energy resources materialized to a considerable extent. It is evident that the 
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involvement of a hegemonic power in a crisis is crucial because the costs of war are 
not affordable for smaller powers, thus leading states to more peaceful means of 
handling the issues. Energy crises are not turning into conflict in cases where the 
states that are part of a dyad are small powers since war over energy would be too 
costly for them. But for the major powers energy is crucial for continuity of 
economic activities, stability and military power. So, a hegemonic power affords the 
costs of the war in order to get the benefits of energy market.  
 
In addition, with these cases, the exact relations within a consumer- producer 
dyad can be explained. Since the importers provide their energy needs from other 
states, it makes more sense that they are less likely to initiate a conflict, because 
conflict is costly for the state. On the other hand, the producers should be the 
aggressive ones mainly because they have the power of energy products and their 
trade. They are able to use energy as a “weapon” in international politics. However, 
these case studies show us that a consumer state can be aggressive if it is a 
hegemonic power. Most of the industries of a major power have to engage in energy 
trades in order to function, especially in the defense sector. In addition, for a major 
power, the costs of the war are easily counterbalanced by the benefits of the energy 
flow attained from the war. Thus the major implication of the comparative case 
results is that only realist theory can properly explain conflict by energy politics 
when one side is a major power.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis concludes that energy politics influences the probability of 
conflict to a certain extent as the realist/neorealist theory would expect. The 
significance of research on conflicts does not arise just from the number of 
casualties, but more so from the causes of the conflict, intentions of states, the 
settlement processes, and the outcomes, all of which considerably influence states as 
well as the world politics. For this reason, this thesis examined energy politics as a 
cause of conflict by comparing two case studies. The major assumption behind this 
research was that energy is very influential in international relations because it is 
quite prominent in daily human life and technology, making it a vital necessity for all 
states alike.  
 
The general focus of this thesis is the causal relationship between scarcity of 
fossil energy resources and likelihood of conflict. In order to portray this 
relationship, a large body of knowledge from both the conflict and the energy 
literature has been analyzed in the literature review chapter. Within the conflict 
literature, all conflict causes were examined alongside energy resources, mainly in 
two levels of analysis: state and system levels. Analysis in the system level included 
causes such as power politics, polarity in the world system, alliance ties, power 
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transitions, power cycles and hegemonic stability theories. Analysis of conflict 
causes in the state level examined territorial relations, contiguity, regime type, public 
opinion, and complex interdependence. 
The effects of fossil energy resources on conflicts were taken as another 
source of conflict in the second part of the literature review. In this section, the 
general causes of energy conflicts were explained, and a conclusion was reached, 
which argued that dyads including states that have scarce energy resources would 
become more conflict prone.  
 
In the theory and methodology chapters, the main goal was to focus on the 
idea of survival, which, according to the realist theory is very significant, and 
explanations were presented regarding how energy sources are important for survival 
and why states are disputing over such sources.  Four hypotheses were constructed to 
explain energy conflicts. The first hypothesis is regarding the interaction of the 
production of fossil energy resources with their consumption and how this interaction 
increases the intensity of conflicts. The interaction between three variables, namely -
proven energy resources, production and consumption- gives the energy need of a 
state, and thus the state’s standpoint in the energy market. Having a brief idea of a 
state’s energy situation, and that state’s intervention to conflict is possible to 
calculate the effect of energy resources on conflicts. The hypothesis explains that if a 
state’s need of energy resources increases, then the conflicts that a particular state 
will engage in can and will most probably be more hostile. Secondly, the thesis tried 
to examine whether a Consumer and Producer dyad is more prone to a conflict. With 
the third hypothesis, the thesis tries to examine whether major power presence in the 
dyad makes the energy conflict more probable. The fourth hypothesis focuses on the 
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war initiators. Not only a consumer state initiates war in case the energy supply is cut 
off and there is a need to provide the necessary reserves, but also a hostility initiation 
can originate from the producing state because of the concerns over market primacy. 
 
In Chapter III, the choices of methodology were also revealed. The 
operationalization and conceptualization were done first in order to explain what the 
dependent, independent and control variables were, and the logical ties between these 
variables. US- Iraq and Russia- Georgia cases were chosen for the comparative case 
study as consumer producer dyads to explore the four hypotheses.   
 
Chapter IV moved to the comparative case study, most different systems 
design, in which two conflicts were tackled: wars between Iraq-US and Russia-
Georgia. The historical backgrounds of the two conflicts were briefly summarized; 
causes of these disputes in the literature were explained, and later the impact of 
energy politics on the conflicts was discussed.  
 
Does the comparative case study support the hypotheses or the theory? Are 
energy politics more significant than other causes of conflict? The data point to 
mixed results. This thesis demonstrates that the realist discourse of energy being the 
major cause of conflict nowadays is conditional. I show that energy is indeed 
significant for states, and thus conflicts,and energy trade issues do threaten 
international peace and security; but in order for energy politics to become a direct 
cause of war, two conditions are required; a consumer-producer dyad and a major 
power involvement in the dyad.   
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As said, a consumer- producer dyad is more likely to engage in conflicts over 
the energy market, if one party in the dyad is a major power. The core reason that lies 
under this result is that since consumers and producers are interdependent (i.e. one 
cannot exist without the other), both try to gain the advantage of the energy market 
from their own perspectives. For a consumer, the security of the supply and the 
reaching of cheap energy are of utmost importance, whereas for a producer, the 
security of the demand, the reduction of cost and the increase in benefit are essential. 
So, consumers behave less aggressively mainly because they are more dependent to 
producers for the supply of energy resources, and they try to emphasize good 
relations with the producer states, but producers try to take advantage of the market, 
gain more money, and by threatening the consumer states, use energy resources as a 
weapon. This is the scenario, which was initially expected in this thesis.   
 
According to realism, states will do anything for the sake of their survival, 
and will decide on matters of national interest from the perspective of survival. 
Energy politics is dependent on the idea of survival since energy is the core 
commodity for human life. However, this thesis shows that in international conflicts, 
the issue of survival is not enough on its own for a state to engage in a conflict with 
another state for energy scarcity issues such as trade, ownership, extraction etc.  The 
cases examined predict that the previously-expected scenario could change 
depending on major power involvement in a conflict. Such a hegemon affects energy 
disputes to turn into conflict because as realism emphasizes, balance of power is 
significant to survive in the world, while the only way to protect the balance of 
power is equalizing the capabilities of the dominant powers in the system. So, for a 
major state, and a state’s improvement, it is necessary to grow faster than the other 
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major powers in the system to protect the relativity. Energy provides a faster growth 
because most of the industries work with machines fueled with energy resources, 
especially the defense sector. Satisfying energy demand is crucial in that sense.  
 
Besides, cost of war is another relevant issue. It can be said that the 
attendance of a hegemonic power in a war is crucial for an energy dispute to turn into 
a war, because the costs of the war can not be easily compensated by the small 
powers. However, for major powers, energy is crucial for continuance of economic 
activities, stability, and for military power. So, a hegemonic power needs to face the 
costs of the war in order to reap the benefits of the energy market.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis argued that energy politics is strongly interrelated 
with conflict and can be accepted as a conditional conflict cause. When the need on 
energy resources increases, the aggressiveness of at least one side increases, and if 
that particular side is a major power, there is a considerable possibility that the crisis 
will turn into a war.  
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